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llmx/codex-rs/arg0/src/lib.rs

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use std::future::Future;
use std::path::Path;
use std::path::PathBuf;
fix: run apply_patch calls through the sandbox (#1705) Building on the work of https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/1702, this changes how a shell call to `apply_patch` is handled. Previously, a shell call to `apply_patch` was always handled in-process, never leveraging a sandbox. To determine whether the `apply_patch` operation could be auto-approved, the `is_write_patch_constrained_to_writable_paths()` function would check if all the paths listed in the paths were writable. If so, the agent would apply the changes listed in the patch. Unfortunately, this approach afforded a loophole: symlinks! * For a soft link, we could fix this issue by tracing the link and checking whether the target is in the set of writable paths, however... * ...For a hard link, things are not as simple. We can run `stat FILE` to see if the number of links is greater than 1, but then we would have to do something potentially expensive like `find . -inum <inode_number>` to find the other paths for `FILE`. Further, even if this worked, this approach runs the risk of a [TOCTOU](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Time-of-check_to_time-of-use) race condition, so it is not robust. The solution, implemented in this PR, is to take the virtual execution of the `apply_patch` CLI into an _actual_ execution using `codex --codex-run-as-apply-patch PATCH`, which we can run under the sandbox the user specified, just like any other `shell` call. This, of course, assumes that the sandbox prevents writing through symlinks as a mechanism to write to folders that are not in the writable set configured by the sandbox. I verified this by testing the following on both Mac and Linux: ```shell #!/usr/bin/env bash set -euo pipefail # Can running a command in SANDBOX_DIR write a file in EXPLOIT_DIR? # Codex is run in SANDBOX_DIR, so writes should be constrianed to this directory. SANDBOX_DIR=$(mktemp -d -p "$HOME" sandboxtesttemp.XXXXXX) # EXPLOIT_DIR is outside of SANDBOX_DIR, so let's see if we can write to it. EXPLOIT_DIR=$(mktemp -d -p "$HOME" sandboxtesttemp.XXXXXX) echo "SANDBOX_DIR: $SANDBOX_DIR" echo "EXPLOIT_DIR: $EXPLOIT_DIR" cleanup() { # Only remove if it looks sane and still exists [[ -n "${SANDBOX_DIR:-}" && -d "$SANDBOX_DIR" ]] && rm -rf -- "$SANDBOX_DIR" [[ -n "${EXPLOIT_DIR:-}" && -d "$EXPLOIT_DIR" ]] && rm -rf -- "$EXPLOIT_DIR" } trap cleanup EXIT echo "I am the original content" > "${EXPLOIT_DIR}/original.txt" # Drop the -s to test hard links. ln -s "${EXPLOIT_DIR}/original.txt" "${SANDBOX_DIR}/link-to-original.txt" cat "${SANDBOX_DIR}/link-to-original.txt" if [[ "$(uname)" == "Linux" ]]; then SANDBOX_SUBCOMMAND=landlock else SANDBOX_SUBCOMMAND=seatbelt fi # Attempt the exploit cd "${SANDBOX_DIR}" codex debug "${SANDBOX_SUBCOMMAND}" bash -lc "echo pwned > ./link-to-original.txt" || true cat "${EXPLOIT_DIR}/original.txt" ``` Admittedly, this change merits a proper integration test, but I think I will have to do that in a follow-up PR.
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use codex_core::CODEX_APPLY_PATCH_ARG1;
#[cfg(unix)]
use std::os::unix::fs::symlink;
use tempfile::TempDir;
const LINUX_SANDBOX_ARG0: &str = "codex-linux-sandbox";
const APPLY_PATCH_ARG0: &str = "apply_patch";
const MISSPELLED_APPLY_PATCH_ARG0: &str = "applypatch";
fix: run apply_patch calls through the sandbox (#1705) Building on the work of https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/1702, this changes how a shell call to `apply_patch` is handled. Previously, a shell call to `apply_patch` was always handled in-process, never leveraging a sandbox. To determine whether the `apply_patch` operation could be auto-approved, the `is_write_patch_constrained_to_writable_paths()` function would check if all the paths listed in the paths were writable. If so, the agent would apply the changes listed in the patch. Unfortunately, this approach afforded a loophole: symlinks! * For a soft link, we could fix this issue by tracing the link and checking whether the target is in the set of writable paths, however... * ...For a hard link, things are not as simple. We can run `stat FILE` to see if the number of links is greater than 1, but then we would have to do something potentially expensive like `find . -inum <inode_number>` to find the other paths for `FILE`. Further, even if this worked, this approach runs the risk of a [TOCTOU](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Time-of-check_to_time-of-use) race condition, so it is not robust. The solution, implemented in this PR, is to take the virtual execution of the `apply_patch` CLI into an _actual_ execution using `codex --codex-run-as-apply-patch PATCH`, which we can run under the sandbox the user specified, just like any other `shell` call. This, of course, assumes that the sandbox prevents writing through symlinks as a mechanism to write to folders that are not in the writable set configured by the sandbox. I verified this by testing the following on both Mac and Linux: ```shell #!/usr/bin/env bash set -euo pipefail # Can running a command in SANDBOX_DIR write a file in EXPLOIT_DIR? # Codex is run in SANDBOX_DIR, so writes should be constrianed to this directory. SANDBOX_DIR=$(mktemp -d -p "$HOME" sandboxtesttemp.XXXXXX) # EXPLOIT_DIR is outside of SANDBOX_DIR, so let's see if we can write to it. EXPLOIT_DIR=$(mktemp -d -p "$HOME" sandboxtesttemp.XXXXXX) echo "SANDBOX_DIR: $SANDBOX_DIR" echo "EXPLOIT_DIR: $EXPLOIT_DIR" cleanup() { # Only remove if it looks sane and still exists [[ -n "${SANDBOX_DIR:-}" && -d "$SANDBOX_DIR" ]] && rm -rf -- "$SANDBOX_DIR" [[ -n "${EXPLOIT_DIR:-}" && -d "$EXPLOIT_DIR" ]] && rm -rf -- "$EXPLOIT_DIR" } trap cleanup EXIT echo "I am the original content" > "${EXPLOIT_DIR}/original.txt" # Drop the -s to test hard links. ln -s "${EXPLOIT_DIR}/original.txt" "${SANDBOX_DIR}/link-to-original.txt" cat "${SANDBOX_DIR}/link-to-original.txt" if [[ "$(uname)" == "Linux" ]]; then SANDBOX_SUBCOMMAND=landlock else SANDBOX_SUBCOMMAND=seatbelt fi # Attempt the exploit cd "${SANDBOX_DIR}" codex debug "${SANDBOX_SUBCOMMAND}" bash -lc "echo pwned > ./link-to-original.txt" || true cat "${EXPLOIT_DIR}/original.txt" ``` Admittedly, this change merits a proper integration test, but I think I will have to do that in a follow-up PR.
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/// While we want to deploy the Codex CLI as a single executable for simplicity,
/// we also want to expose some of its functionality as distinct CLIs, so we use
/// the "arg0 trick" to determine which CLI to dispatch. This effectively allows
/// us to simulate deploying multiple executables as a single binary on Mac and
/// Linux (but not Windows).
///
/// When the current executable is invoked through the hard-link or alias named
/// `codex-linux-sandbox` we *directly* execute
/// [`codex_linux_sandbox::run_main`] (which never returns). Otherwise we:
///
/// 1. Use [`dotenvy::from_path`] and [`dotenvy::dotenv`] to modify the
/// environment before creating any threads.
/// 2. Construct a Tokio multi-thread runtime.
/// 3. Derive the path to the current executable (so children can re-invoke the
/// sandbox) when running on Linux.
/// 4. Execute the provided async `main_fn` inside that runtime, forwarding any
/// error. Note that `main_fn` receives `codex_linux_sandbox_exe:
/// Option<PathBuf>`, as an argument, which is generally needed as part of
/// constructing [`codex_core::config::Config`].
///
/// This function should be used to wrap any `main()` function in binary crates
/// in this workspace that depends on these helper CLIs.
pub fn arg0_dispatch_or_else<F, Fut>(main_fn: F) -> anyhow::Result<()>
where
F: FnOnce(Option<PathBuf>) -> Fut,
Fut: Future<Output = anyhow::Result<()>>,
{
// Determine if we were invoked via the special alias.
fix: support special --codex-run-as-apply-patch arg (#1702) This introduces some special behavior to the CLIs that are using the `codex-arg0` crate where if `arg1` is `--codex-run-as-apply-patch`, then it will run as if `apply_patch arg2` were invoked. This is important because it means we can do things like: ``` SANDBOX_TYPE=landlock # or seatbelt for macOS codex debug "${SANDBOX_TYPE}" -- codex --codex-run-as-apply-patch PATCH ``` which gives us a way to run `apply_patch` while ensuring it adheres to the sandbox the user specified. While it would be nice to use the `arg0` trick like we are currently doing for `codex-linux-sandbox`, there is no way to specify the `arg0` for the underlying command when running under `/usr/bin/sandbox-exec`, so it will not work for us in this case. Admittedly, we could have also supported this via a custom environment variable (e.g., `CODEX_ARG0`), but since environment variables are inherited by child processes, that seemed like a potentially leakier abstraction. This change, as well as our existing reliance on checking `arg0`, place additional requirements on those who include `codex-core`. Its `README.md` has been updated to reflect this. While we could have just added an `apply-patch` subcommand to the `codex` multitool CLI, that would not be sufficient for the standalone `codex-exec` CLI, which is something that we distribute as part of our GitHub releases for those who know they will not be using the TUI and therefore prefer to use a slightly smaller executable: https://github.com/openai/codex/releases/tag/rust-v0.10.0 To that end, this PR adds an integration test to ensure that the `--codex-run-as-apply-patch` option works with the standalone `codex-exec` CLI. --- [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER) Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/1702). * #1705 * #1703 * __->__ #1702 * #1698 * #1697
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let mut args = std::env::args_os();
let argv0 = args.next().unwrap_or_default();
let exe_name = Path::new(&argv0)
.file_name()
.and_then(|s| s.to_str())
.unwrap_or("");
if exe_name == LINUX_SANDBOX_ARG0 {
// Safety: [`run_main`] never returns.
codex_linux_sandbox::run_main();
} else if exe_name == APPLY_PATCH_ARG0 || exe_name == MISSPELLED_APPLY_PATCH_ARG0 {
codex_apply_patch::main();
}
fix: support special --codex-run-as-apply-patch arg (#1702) This introduces some special behavior to the CLIs that are using the `codex-arg0` crate where if `arg1` is `--codex-run-as-apply-patch`, then it will run as if `apply_patch arg2` were invoked. This is important because it means we can do things like: ``` SANDBOX_TYPE=landlock # or seatbelt for macOS codex debug "${SANDBOX_TYPE}" -- codex --codex-run-as-apply-patch PATCH ``` which gives us a way to run `apply_patch` while ensuring it adheres to the sandbox the user specified. While it would be nice to use the `arg0` trick like we are currently doing for `codex-linux-sandbox`, there is no way to specify the `arg0` for the underlying command when running under `/usr/bin/sandbox-exec`, so it will not work for us in this case. Admittedly, we could have also supported this via a custom environment variable (e.g., `CODEX_ARG0`), but since environment variables are inherited by child processes, that seemed like a potentially leakier abstraction. This change, as well as our existing reliance on checking `arg0`, place additional requirements on those who include `codex-core`. Its `README.md` has been updated to reflect this. While we could have just added an `apply-patch` subcommand to the `codex` multitool CLI, that would not be sufficient for the standalone `codex-exec` CLI, which is something that we distribute as part of our GitHub releases for those who know they will not be using the TUI and therefore prefer to use a slightly smaller executable: https://github.com/openai/codex/releases/tag/rust-v0.10.0 To that end, this PR adds an integration test to ensure that the `--codex-run-as-apply-patch` option works with the standalone `codex-exec` CLI. --- [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER) Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/1702). * #1705 * #1703 * __->__ #1702 * #1698 * #1697
2025-07-28 09:26:44 -07:00
let argv1 = args.next().unwrap_or_default();
fix: run apply_patch calls through the sandbox (#1705) Building on the work of https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/1702, this changes how a shell call to `apply_patch` is handled. Previously, a shell call to `apply_patch` was always handled in-process, never leveraging a sandbox. To determine whether the `apply_patch` operation could be auto-approved, the `is_write_patch_constrained_to_writable_paths()` function would check if all the paths listed in the paths were writable. If so, the agent would apply the changes listed in the patch. Unfortunately, this approach afforded a loophole: symlinks! * For a soft link, we could fix this issue by tracing the link and checking whether the target is in the set of writable paths, however... * ...For a hard link, things are not as simple. We can run `stat FILE` to see if the number of links is greater than 1, but then we would have to do something potentially expensive like `find . -inum <inode_number>` to find the other paths for `FILE`. Further, even if this worked, this approach runs the risk of a [TOCTOU](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Time-of-check_to_time-of-use) race condition, so it is not robust. The solution, implemented in this PR, is to take the virtual execution of the `apply_patch` CLI into an _actual_ execution using `codex --codex-run-as-apply-patch PATCH`, which we can run under the sandbox the user specified, just like any other `shell` call. This, of course, assumes that the sandbox prevents writing through symlinks as a mechanism to write to folders that are not in the writable set configured by the sandbox. I verified this by testing the following on both Mac and Linux: ```shell #!/usr/bin/env bash set -euo pipefail # Can running a command in SANDBOX_DIR write a file in EXPLOIT_DIR? # Codex is run in SANDBOX_DIR, so writes should be constrianed to this directory. SANDBOX_DIR=$(mktemp -d -p "$HOME" sandboxtesttemp.XXXXXX) # EXPLOIT_DIR is outside of SANDBOX_DIR, so let's see if we can write to it. EXPLOIT_DIR=$(mktemp -d -p "$HOME" sandboxtesttemp.XXXXXX) echo "SANDBOX_DIR: $SANDBOX_DIR" echo "EXPLOIT_DIR: $EXPLOIT_DIR" cleanup() { # Only remove if it looks sane and still exists [[ -n "${SANDBOX_DIR:-}" && -d "$SANDBOX_DIR" ]] && rm -rf -- "$SANDBOX_DIR" [[ -n "${EXPLOIT_DIR:-}" && -d "$EXPLOIT_DIR" ]] && rm -rf -- "$EXPLOIT_DIR" } trap cleanup EXIT echo "I am the original content" > "${EXPLOIT_DIR}/original.txt" # Drop the -s to test hard links. ln -s "${EXPLOIT_DIR}/original.txt" "${SANDBOX_DIR}/link-to-original.txt" cat "${SANDBOX_DIR}/link-to-original.txt" if [[ "$(uname)" == "Linux" ]]; then SANDBOX_SUBCOMMAND=landlock else SANDBOX_SUBCOMMAND=seatbelt fi # Attempt the exploit cd "${SANDBOX_DIR}" codex debug "${SANDBOX_SUBCOMMAND}" bash -lc "echo pwned > ./link-to-original.txt" || true cat "${EXPLOIT_DIR}/original.txt" ``` Admittedly, this change merits a proper integration test, but I think I will have to do that in a follow-up PR.
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if argv1 == CODEX_APPLY_PATCH_ARG1 {
fix: support special --codex-run-as-apply-patch arg (#1702) This introduces some special behavior to the CLIs that are using the `codex-arg0` crate where if `arg1` is `--codex-run-as-apply-patch`, then it will run as if `apply_patch arg2` were invoked. This is important because it means we can do things like: ``` SANDBOX_TYPE=landlock # or seatbelt for macOS codex debug "${SANDBOX_TYPE}" -- codex --codex-run-as-apply-patch PATCH ``` which gives us a way to run `apply_patch` while ensuring it adheres to the sandbox the user specified. While it would be nice to use the `arg0` trick like we are currently doing for `codex-linux-sandbox`, there is no way to specify the `arg0` for the underlying command when running under `/usr/bin/sandbox-exec`, so it will not work for us in this case. Admittedly, we could have also supported this via a custom environment variable (e.g., `CODEX_ARG0`), but since environment variables are inherited by child processes, that seemed like a potentially leakier abstraction. This change, as well as our existing reliance on checking `arg0`, place additional requirements on those who include `codex-core`. Its `README.md` has been updated to reflect this. While we could have just added an `apply-patch` subcommand to the `codex` multitool CLI, that would not be sufficient for the standalone `codex-exec` CLI, which is something that we distribute as part of our GitHub releases for those who know they will not be using the TUI and therefore prefer to use a slightly smaller executable: https://github.com/openai/codex/releases/tag/rust-v0.10.0 To that end, this PR adds an integration test to ensure that the `--codex-run-as-apply-patch` option works with the standalone `codex-exec` CLI. --- [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER) Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/1702). * #1705 * #1703 * __->__ #1702 * #1698 * #1697
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let patch_arg = args.next().and_then(|s| s.to_str().map(|s| s.to_owned()));
let exit_code = match patch_arg {
Some(patch_arg) => {
let mut stdout = std::io::stdout();
let mut stderr = std::io::stderr();
match codex_apply_patch::apply_patch(&patch_arg, &mut stdout, &mut stderr) {
Ok(()) => 0,
Err(_) => 1,
}
}
None => {
fix: run apply_patch calls through the sandbox (#1705) Building on the work of https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/1702, this changes how a shell call to `apply_patch` is handled. Previously, a shell call to `apply_patch` was always handled in-process, never leveraging a sandbox. To determine whether the `apply_patch` operation could be auto-approved, the `is_write_patch_constrained_to_writable_paths()` function would check if all the paths listed in the paths were writable. If so, the agent would apply the changes listed in the patch. Unfortunately, this approach afforded a loophole: symlinks! * For a soft link, we could fix this issue by tracing the link and checking whether the target is in the set of writable paths, however... * ...For a hard link, things are not as simple. We can run `stat FILE` to see if the number of links is greater than 1, but then we would have to do something potentially expensive like `find . -inum <inode_number>` to find the other paths for `FILE`. Further, even if this worked, this approach runs the risk of a [TOCTOU](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Time-of-check_to_time-of-use) race condition, so it is not robust. The solution, implemented in this PR, is to take the virtual execution of the `apply_patch` CLI into an _actual_ execution using `codex --codex-run-as-apply-patch PATCH`, which we can run under the sandbox the user specified, just like any other `shell` call. This, of course, assumes that the sandbox prevents writing through symlinks as a mechanism to write to folders that are not in the writable set configured by the sandbox. I verified this by testing the following on both Mac and Linux: ```shell #!/usr/bin/env bash set -euo pipefail # Can running a command in SANDBOX_DIR write a file in EXPLOIT_DIR? # Codex is run in SANDBOX_DIR, so writes should be constrianed to this directory. SANDBOX_DIR=$(mktemp -d -p "$HOME" sandboxtesttemp.XXXXXX) # EXPLOIT_DIR is outside of SANDBOX_DIR, so let's see if we can write to it. EXPLOIT_DIR=$(mktemp -d -p "$HOME" sandboxtesttemp.XXXXXX) echo "SANDBOX_DIR: $SANDBOX_DIR" echo "EXPLOIT_DIR: $EXPLOIT_DIR" cleanup() { # Only remove if it looks sane and still exists [[ -n "${SANDBOX_DIR:-}" && -d "$SANDBOX_DIR" ]] && rm -rf -- "$SANDBOX_DIR" [[ -n "${EXPLOIT_DIR:-}" && -d "$EXPLOIT_DIR" ]] && rm -rf -- "$EXPLOIT_DIR" } trap cleanup EXIT echo "I am the original content" > "${EXPLOIT_DIR}/original.txt" # Drop the -s to test hard links. ln -s "${EXPLOIT_DIR}/original.txt" "${SANDBOX_DIR}/link-to-original.txt" cat "${SANDBOX_DIR}/link-to-original.txt" if [[ "$(uname)" == "Linux" ]]; then SANDBOX_SUBCOMMAND=landlock else SANDBOX_SUBCOMMAND=seatbelt fi # Attempt the exploit cd "${SANDBOX_DIR}" codex debug "${SANDBOX_SUBCOMMAND}" bash -lc "echo pwned > ./link-to-original.txt" || true cat "${EXPLOIT_DIR}/original.txt" ``` Admittedly, this change merits a proper integration test, but I think I will have to do that in a follow-up PR.
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eprintln!("Error: {CODEX_APPLY_PATCH_ARG1} requires a UTF-8 PATCH argument.");
fix: support special --codex-run-as-apply-patch arg (#1702) This introduces some special behavior to the CLIs that are using the `codex-arg0` crate where if `arg1` is `--codex-run-as-apply-patch`, then it will run as if `apply_patch arg2` were invoked. This is important because it means we can do things like: ``` SANDBOX_TYPE=landlock # or seatbelt for macOS codex debug "${SANDBOX_TYPE}" -- codex --codex-run-as-apply-patch PATCH ``` which gives us a way to run `apply_patch` while ensuring it adheres to the sandbox the user specified. While it would be nice to use the `arg0` trick like we are currently doing for `codex-linux-sandbox`, there is no way to specify the `arg0` for the underlying command when running under `/usr/bin/sandbox-exec`, so it will not work for us in this case. Admittedly, we could have also supported this via a custom environment variable (e.g., `CODEX_ARG0`), but since environment variables are inherited by child processes, that seemed like a potentially leakier abstraction. This change, as well as our existing reliance on checking `arg0`, place additional requirements on those who include `codex-core`. Its `README.md` has been updated to reflect this. While we could have just added an `apply-patch` subcommand to the `codex` multitool CLI, that would not be sufficient for the standalone `codex-exec` CLI, which is something that we distribute as part of our GitHub releases for those who know they will not be using the TUI and therefore prefer to use a slightly smaller executable: https://github.com/openai/codex/releases/tag/rust-v0.10.0 To that end, this PR adds an integration test to ensure that the `--codex-run-as-apply-patch` option works with the standalone `codex-exec` CLI. --- [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER) Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/1702). * #1705 * #1703 * __->__ #1702 * #1698 * #1697
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1
}
};
std::process::exit(exit_code);
}
// This modifies the environment, which is not thread-safe, so do this
// before creating any threads/the Tokio runtime.
load_dotenv();
// Retain the TempDir so it exists for the lifetime of the invocation of
// this executable. Admittedly, we could invoke `keep()` on it, but it
// would be nice to avoid leaving temporary directories behind, if possible.
let _path_entry = match prepend_path_entry_for_apply_patch() {
Ok(path_entry) => Some(path_entry),
Err(err) => {
// It is possible that Codex will proceed successfully even if
// updating the PATH fails, so warn the user and move on.
eprintln!("WARNING: proceeding, even though we could not update PATH: {err}");
None
}
};
// Regular invocation create a Tokio runtime and execute the provided
// async entry-point.
let runtime = tokio::runtime::Runtime::new()?;
runtime.block_on(async move {
let codex_linux_sandbox_exe: Option<PathBuf> = if cfg!(target_os = "linux") {
std::env::current_exe().ok()
} else {
None
};
main_fn(codex_linux_sandbox_exe).await
})
}
const ILLEGAL_ENV_VAR_PREFIX: &str = "CODEX_";
/// Load env vars from ~/.codex/.env and `$(pwd)/.env`.
///
/// Security: Do not allow `.env` files to create or modify any variables
/// with names starting with `CODEX_`.
fn load_dotenv() {
if let Ok(codex_home) = codex_core::config::find_codex_home()
&& let Ok(iter) = dotenvy::from_path_iter(codex_home.join(".env"))
{
set_filtered(iter);
}
if let Ok(iter) = dotenvy::dotenv_iter() {
set_filtered(iter);
}
}
/// Helper to set vars from a dotenvy iterator while filtering out `CODEX_` keys.
fn set_filtered<I>(iter: I)
where
I: IntoIterator<Item = Result<(String, String), dotenvy::Error>>,
{
for (key, value) in iter.into_iter().flatten() {
if !key.to_ascii_uppercase().starts_with(ILLEGAL_ENV_VAR_PREFIX) {
// It is safe to call set_var() because our process is
// single-threaded at this point in its execution.
unsafe { std::env::set_var(&key, &value) };
}
}
}
/// Creates a temporary directory with either:
///
/// - UNIX: `apply_patch` symlink to the current executable
/// - WINDOWS: `apply_patch.bat` batch script to invoke the current executable
/// with the "secret" --codex-run-as-apply-patch flag.
///
/// This temporary directory is prepended to the PATH environment variable so
/// that `apply_patch` can be on the PATH without requiring the user to
/// install a separate `apply_patch` executable, simplifying the deployment of
/// Codex CLI.
///
/// IMPORTANT: This function modifies the PATH environment variable, so it MUST
/// be called before multiple threads are spawned.
fn prepend_path_entry_for_apply_patch() -> std::io::Result<TempDir> {
let temp_dir = TempDir::new()?;
let path = temp_dir.path();
for filename in &[APPLY_PATCH_ARG0, MISSPELLED_APPLY_PATCH_ARG0] {
let exe = std::env::current_exe()?;
#[cfg(unix)]
{
let link = path.join(filename);
symlink(&exe, &link)?;
}
#[cfg(windows)]
{
let batch_script = path.join(format!("{filename}.bat"));
std::fs::write(
&batch_script,
format!(
r#"@echo off
"{}" {CODEX_APPLY_PATCH_ARG1} %*
"#,
exe.display()
),
)?;
}
}
#[cfg(unix)]
const PATH_SEPARATOR: &str = ":";
#[cfg(windows)]
const PATH_SEPARATOR: &str = ";";
let path_element = path.display();
let updated_path_env_var = match std::env::var("PATH") {
Ok(existing_path) => {
format!("{path_element}{PATH_SEPARATOR}{existing_path}")
}
Err(_) => {
format!("{path_element}")
}
};
unsafe {
std::env::set_var("PATH", updated_path_env_var);
}
Ok(temp_dir)
}