implement command safety for PowerShell commands (#4269)

Implement command safety for PowerShell commands on Windows

This change adds a new Windows-specific command-safety module under
`codex-rs/core/src/command_safety/windows_safe_commands.rs` to strictly
sanitise PowerShell invocations. Key points:

- Introduce `is_safe_command_windows()` to only allow explicitly
read-only PowerShell calls.
- Parse and split PowerShell invocations (including inline `-Command`
scripts and pipelines).
- Block unsafe switches (`-File`, `-EncodedCommand`, `-ExecutionPolicy`,
unknown flags, call operators, redirections, separators).
- Whitelist only read-only cmdlets (`Get-ChildItem`, `Get-Content`,
`Select-Object`, etc.), safe Git subcommands (`status`, `log`, `show`,
`diff`, `cat-file`), and ripgrep without unsafe options.
- Add comprehensive unit tests covering allowed and rejected command
patterns (nested calls, side effects, chaining, redirections).

This ensures Codex on Windows can safely execute discover-only
PowerShell workflows without risking destructive operations.
This commit is contained in:
iceweasel-oai
2025-10-01 09:56:48 -07:00
committed by GitHub
parent 325fad1d92
commit dde615f482

View File

@@ -1,25 +1,431 @@
// This is a WIP. This will eventually contain a real list of common safe Windows commands.
pub fn is_safe_command_windows(_command: &[String]) -> bool {
use shlex::split as shlex_split;
/// On Windows, we conservatively allow only clearly read-only PowerShell invocations
/// that match a small safelist. Anything else (including direct CMD commands) is unsafe.
pub fn is_safe_command_windows(command: &[String]) -> bool {
if let Some(commands) = try_parse_powershell_command_sequence(command) {
return commands
.iter()
.all(|cmd| is_safe_powershell_command(cmd.as_slice()));
}
// Only PowerShell invocations are allowed on Windows for now; anything else is unsafe.
false
}
/// Returns each command sequence if the invocation starts with a PowerShell binary.
/// For example, the tokens from `pwsh Get-ChildItem | Measure-Object` become two sequences.
fn try_parse_powershell_command_sequence(command: &[String]) -> Option<Vec<Vec<String>>> {
let (exe, rest) = command.split_first()?;
if !is_powershell_executable(exe) {
return None;
}
parse_powershell_invocation(rest)
}
/// Parses a PowerShell invocation into discrete command vectors, rejecting unsafe patterns.
fn parse_powershell_invocation(args: &[String]) -> Option<Vec<Vec<String>>> {
if args.is_empty() {
// Examples rejected here: "pwsh" and "powershell.exe" with no additional arguments.
return None;
}
let mut idx = 0;
while idx < args.len() {
let arg = &args[idx];
let lower = arg.to_ascii_lowercase();
match lower.as_str() {
"-command" | "/command" | "-c" => {
let script = args.get(idx + 1)?;
if idx + 2 != args.len() {
// Reject if there is more than one token representing the actual command.
// Examples rejected here: "pwsh -Command foo bar" and "powershell -c ls extra".
return None;
}
return parse_powershell_script(script);
}
_ if lower.starts_with("-command:") || lower.starts_with("/command:") => {
if idx + 1 != args.len() {
// Reject if there are more tokens after the command itself.
// Examples rejected here: "pwsh -Command:dir C:\\" and "powershell /Command:dir C:\\" with trailing args.
return None;
}
let script = arg.split_once(':')?.1;
return parse_powershell_script(script);
}
// Benign, no-arg flags we tolerate.
"-nologo" | "-noprofile" | "-noninteractive" | "-mta" | "-sta" => {
idx += 1;
continue;
}
// Explicitly forbidden/opaque or unnecessary for read-only operations.
"-encodedcommand" | "-ec" | "-file" | "/file" | "-windowstyle" | "-executionpolicy"
| "-workingdirectory" => {
// Examples rejected here: "pwsh -EncodedCommand ..." and "powershell -File script.ps1".
return None;
}
// Unknown switch → bail conservatively.
_ if lower.starts_with('-') => {
// Examples rejected here: "pwsh -UnknownFlag" and "powershell -foo bar".
return None;
}
// If we hit non-flag tokens, treat the remainder as a command sequence.
// This happens if powershell is invoked without -Command, e.g.
// ["pwsh", "-NoLogo", "git", "-c", "core.pager=cat", "status"]
_ => {
return split_into_commands(args[idx..].to_vec());
}
}
}
// Examples rejected here: "pwsh" and "powershell.exe -NoLogo" without a script.
None
}
/// Tokenizes an inline PowerShell script and delegates to the command splitter.
/// Examples of when this is called: pwsh.exe -Command '<script>' or pwsh.exe -Command:<script>
fn parse_powershell_script(script: &str) -> Option<Vec<Vec<String>>> {
let tokens = shlex_split(script)?;
split_into_commands(tokens)
}
/// Splits tokens into pipeline segments while ensuring no unsafe separators slip through.
/// e.g. Get-ChildItem | Measure-Object -> [['Get-ChildItem'], ['Measure-Object']]
fn split_into_commands(tokens: Vec<String>) -> Option<Vec<Vec<String>>> {
if tokens.is_empty() {
// Examples rejected here: "pwsh -Command ''" and "powershell -Command \"\"".
return None;
}
let mut commands = Vec::new();
let mut current = Vec::new();
for token in tokens.into_iter() {
match token.as_str() {
"|" | "||" | "&&" | ";" => {
if current.is_empty() {
// Examples rejected here: "pwsh -Command '| Get-ChildItem'" and "pwsh -Command '; dir'".
return None;
}
commands.push(current);
current = Vec::new();
}
// Reject if any token embeds separators, redirection, or call operator characters.
_ if token.contains(['|', ';', '>', '<', '&']) || token.contains("$(") => {
// Examples rejected here: "pwsh -Command 'dir|select'" and "pwsh -Command 'echo hi > out.txt'".
return None;
}
_ => current.push(token),
}
}
if current.is_empty() {
// Examples rejected here: "pwsh -Command 'dir |'" and "pwsh -Command 'Get-ChildItem ;'".
return None;
}
commands.push(current);
Some(commands)
}
/// Returns true when the executable name is one of the supported PowerShell binaries.
fn is_powershell_executable(exe: &str) -> bool {
matches!(
exe.to_ascii_lowercase().as_str(),
"powershell" | "powershell.exe" | "pwsh" | "pwsh.exe"
)
}
/// Validates that a parsed PowerShell command stays within our read-only safelist.
/// Everything before this is parsing, and rejecting things that make us feel uncomfortable.
fn is_safe_powershell_command(words: &[String]) -> bool {
if words.is_empty() {
// Examples rejected here: "pwsh -Command ''" and "pwsh -Command \"\"".
return false;
}
// Reject nested unsafe cmdlets inside parentheses or arguments
for w in words.iter() {
let inner = w
.trim_matches(|c| c == '(' || c == ')')
.trim_start_matches('-')
.to_ascii_lowercase();
if matches!(
inner.as_str(),
"set-content"
| "add-content"
| "out-file"
| "new-item"
| "remove-item"
| "move-item"
| "copy-item"
| "rename-item"
| "start-process"
| "stop-process"
) {
// Examples rejected here: "Write-Output (Set-Content foo6.txt 'abc')" and "Get-Content (New-Item bar.txt)".
return false;
}
}
// Block PowerShell call operator or any redirection explicitly.
if words.iter().any(|w| {
matches!(
w.as_str(),
"&" | ">" | ">>" | "1>" | "2>" | "2>&1" | "*>" | "<" | "<<"
)
}) {
// Examples rejected here: "pwsh -Command '& Remove-Item foo'" and "pwsh -Command 'Get-Content foo > bar'".
return false;
}
let command = words[0]
.trim_matches(|c| c == '(' || c == ')')
.trim_start_matches('-')
.to_ascii_lowercase();
match command.as_str() {
"echo" | "write-output" | "write-host" => true, // (no redirection allowed)
"dir" | "ls" | "get-childitem" | "gci" => true,
"cat" | "type" | "gc" | "get-content" => true,
"select-string" | "sls" | "findstr" => true,
"measure-object" | "measure" => true,
"get-location" | "gl" | "pwd" => true,
"test-path" | "tp" => true,
"resolve-path" | "rvpa" => true,
"select-object" | "select" => true,
"get-item" => true,
"git" => is_safe_git_command(words),
"rg" => is_safe_ripgrep(words),
// Extra safety: explicitly prohibit common side-effecting cmdlets regardless of args.
"set-content" | "add-content" | "out-file" | "new-item" | "remove-item" | "move-item"
| "copy-item" | "rename-item" | "start-process" | "stop-process" => {
// Examples rejected here: "pwsh -Command 'Set-Content notes.txt data'" and "pwsh -Command 'Remove-Item temp.log'".
false
}
_ => {
// Examples rejected here: "pwsh -Command 'Invoke-WebRequest https://example.com'" and "pwsh -Command 'Start-Service Spooler'".
false
}
}
}
/// Checks that an `rg` invocation avoids options that can spawn arbitrary executables.
fn is_safe_ripgrep(words: &[String]) -> bool {
const UNSAFE_RIPGREP_OPTIONS_WITH_ARGS: &[&str] = &["--pre", "--hostname-bin"];
const UNSAFE_RIPGREP_OPTIONS_WITHOUT_ARGS: &[&str] = &["--search-zip", "-z"];
!words.iter().skip(1).any(|arg| {
let arg_lc = arg.to_ascii_lowercase();
// Examples rejected here: "pwsh -Command 'rg --pre cat pattern'" and "pwsh -Command 'rg --search-zip pattern'".
UNSAFE_RIPGREP_OPTIONS_WITHOUT_ARGS.contains(&arg_lc.as_str())
|| UNSAFE_RIPGREP_OPTIONS_WITH_ARGS
.iter()
.any(|opt| arg_lc == *opt || arg_lc.starts_with(&format!("{opt}=")))
})
}
/// Ensures a Git command sticks to whitelisted read-only subcommands and flags.
fn is_safe_git_command(words: &[String]) -> bool {
const SAFE_SUBCOMMANDS: &[&str] = &["status", "log", "show", "diff", "cat-file"];
let mut iter = words.iter().skip(1);
while let Some(arg) = iter.next() {
let arg_lc = arg.to_ascii_lowercase();
if arg.starts_with('-') {
if arg.eq_ignore_ascii_case("-c") || arg.eq_ignore_ascii_case("--config") {
if iter.next().is_none() {
// Examples rejected here: "pwsh -Command 'git -c'" and "pwsh -Command 'git --config'".
return false;
}
continue;
}
if arg_lc.starts_with("-c=")
|| arg_lc.starts_with("--config=")
|| arg_lc.starts_with("--git-dir=")
|| arg_lc.starts_with("--work-tree=")
{
continue;
}
if arg.eq_ignore_ascii_case("--git-dir") || arg.eq_ignore_ascii_case("--work-tree") {
if iter.next().is_none() {
// Examples rejected here: "pwsh -Command 'git --git-dir'" and "pwsh -Command 'git --work-tree'".
return false;
}
continue;
}
continue;
}
return SAFE_SUBCOMMANDS.contains(&arg_lc.as_str());
}
// Examples rejected here: "pwsh -Command 'git'" and "pwsh -Command 'git status --short | Remove-Item foo'".
false
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::is_safe_command_windows;
use std::string::ToString;
/// Converts a slice of string literals into owned `String`s for the tests.
fn vec_str(args: &[&str]) -> Vec<String> {
args.iter().map(ToString::to_string).collect()
}
#[test]
fn everything_is_unsafe() {
for cmd in [
vec_str(&["powershell.exe", "-NoLogo", "-Command", "echo hello"]),
vec_str(&["copy", "foo", "bar"]),
vec_str(&["del", "file.txt"]),
vec_str(&["powershell.exe", "Get-ChildItem"]),
] {
assert!(!is_safe_command_windows(&cmd));
}
fn recognizes_safe_powershell_wrappers() {
assert!(is_safe_command_windows(&vec_str(&[
"powershell.exe",
"-NoLogo",
"-Command",
"Get-ChildItem -Path .",
])));
assert!(is_safe_command_windows(&vec_str(&[
"powershell.exe",
"-NoProfile",
"-Command",
"git status",
])));
assert!(is_safe_command_windows(&vec_str(&[
"powershell.exe",
"Get-Content",
"Cargo.toml",
])));
// pwsh parity
assert!(is_safe_command_windows(&vec_str(&[
"pwsh.exe",
"-NoProfile",
"-Command",
"Get-ChildItem",
])));
}
#[test]
fn allows_read_only_pipelines_and_git_usage() {
assert!(is_safe_command_windows(&vec_str(&[
"pwsh",
"-NoLogo",
"-NoProfile",
"-Command",
"rg --files-with-matches foo | Measure-Object | Select-Object -ExpandProperty Count",
])));
assert!(is_safe_command_windows(&vec_str(&[
"pwsh",
"-NoLogo",
"-NoProfile",
"-Command",
"Get-Content foo.rs | Select-Object -Skip 200",
])));
assert!(is_safe_command_windows(&vec_str(&[
"pwsh",
"-NoLogo",
"-NoProfile",
"-Command",
"git -c core.pager=cat show HEAD:foo.rs",
])));
assert!(is_safe_command_windows(&vec_str(&[
"pwsh",
"-Command",
"-git cat-file -p HEAD:foo.rs",
])));
assert!(is_safe_command_windows(&vec_str(&[
"pwsh",
"-Command",
"(Get-Content foo.rs -Raw)",
])));
assert!(is_safe_command_windows(&vec_str(&[
"pwsh",
"-Command",
"Get-Item foo.rs | Select-Object Length",
])));
}
#[test]
fn rejects_powershell_commands_with_side_effects() {
assert!(!is_safe_command_windows(&vec_str(&[
"powershell.exe",
"-NoLogo",
"-Command",
"Remove-Item foo.txt",
])));
assert!(!is_safe_command_windows(&vec_str(&[
"powershell.exe",
"-NoProfile",
"-Command",
"rg --pre cat",
])));
assert!(!is_safe_command_windows(&vec_str(&[
"powershell.exe",
"-Command",
"Set-Content foo.txt 'hello'",
])));
// Redirections are blocked
assert!(!is_safe_command_windows(&vec_str(&[
"powershell.exe",
"-Command",
"echo hi > out.txt",
])));
assert!(!is_safe_command_windows(&vec_str(&[
"powershell.exe",
"-Command",
"Get-Content x | Out-File y",
])));
assert!(!is_safe_command_windows(&vec_str(&[
"powershell.exe",
"-Command",
"Write-Output foo 2> err.txt",
])));
// Call operator is blocked
assert!(!is_safe_command_windows(&vec_str(&[
"powershell.exe",
"-Command",
"& Remove-Item foo",
])));
// Chained safe + unsafe must fail
assert!(!is_safe_command_windows(&vec_str(&[
"powershell.exe",
"-Command",
"Get-ChildItem; Remove-Item foo",
])));
// Nested unsafe cmdlet inside safe command must fail
assert!(!is_safe_command_windows(&vec_str(&[
"powershell.exe",
"-Command",
"Write-Output (Set-Content foo6.txt 'abc')",
])));
// Additional nested unsafe cmdlet examples must fail
assert!(!is_safe_command_windows(&vec_str(&[
"powershell.exe",
"-Command",
"Write-Host (Remove-Item foo.txt)",
])));
assert!(!is_safe_command_windows(&vec_str(&[
"powershell.exe",
"-Command",
"Get-Content (New-Item bar.txt)",
])));
}
}