feat: Complete LLMX v0.1.0 - Rebrand from Codex with LiteLLM Integration
This release represents a comprehensive transformation of the codebase from Codex to LLMX, enhanced with LiteLLM integration to support 100+ LLM providers through a unified API. ## Major Changes ### Phase 1: Repository & Infrastructure Setup - Established new repository structure and branching strategy - Created comprehensive project documentation (CLAUDE.md, LITELLM-SETUP.md) - Set up development environment and tooling configuration ### Phase 2: Rust Workspace Transformation - Renamed all Rust crates from `codex-*` to `llmx-*` (30+ crates) - Updated package names, binary names, and workspace members - Renamed core modules: codex.rs → llmx.rs, codex_delegate.rs → llmx_delegate.rs - Updated all internal references, imports, and type names - Renamed directories: codex-rs/ → llmx-rs/, codex-backend-openapi-models/ → llmx-backend-openapi-models/ - Fixed all Rust compilation errors after mass rename ### Phase 3: LiteLLM Integration - Integrated LiteLLM for multi-provider LLM support (Anthropic, OpenAI, Azure, Google AI, AWS Bedrock, etc.) - Implemented OpenAI-compatible Chat Completions API support - Added model family detection and provider-specific handling - Updated authentication to support LiteLLM API keys - Renamed environment variables: OPENAI_BASE_URL → LLMX_BASE_URL - Added LLMX_API_KEY for unified authentication - Enhanced error handling for Chat Completions API responses - Implemented fallback mechanisms between Responses API and Chat Completions API ### Phase 4: TypeScript/Node.js Components - Renamed npm package: @codex/codex-cli → @valknar/llmx - Updated TypeScript SDK to use new LLMX APIs and endpoints - Fixed all TypeScript compilation and linting errors - Updated SDK tests to support both API backends - Enhanced mock server to handle multiple API formats - Updated build scripts for cross-platform packaging ### Phase 5: Configuration & Documentation - Updated all configuration files to use LLMX naming - Rewrote README and documentation for LLMX branding - Updated config paths: ~/.codex/ → ~/.llmx/ - Added comprehensive LiteLLM setup guide - Updated all user-facing strings and help text - Created release plan and migration documentation ### Phase 6: Testing & Validation - Fixed all Rust tests for new naming scheme - Updated snapshot tests in TUI (36 frame files) - Fixed authentication storage tests - Updated Chat Completions payload and SSE tests - Fixed SDK tests for new API endpoints - Ensured compatibility with Claude Sonnet 4.5 model - Fixed test environment variables (LLMX_API_KEY, LLMX_BASE_URL) ### Phase 7: Build & Release Pipeline - Updated GitHub Actions workflows for LLMX binary names - Fixed rust-release.yml to reference llmx-rs/ instead of codex-rs/ - Updated CI/CD pipelines for new package names - Made Apple code signing optional in release workflow - Enhanced npm packaging resilience for partial platform builds - Added Windows sandbox support to workspace - Updated dotslash configuration for new binary names ### Phase 8: Final Polish - Renamed all assets (.github images, labels, templates) - Updated VSCode and DevContainer configurations - Fixed all clippy warnings and formatting issues - Applied cargo fmt and prettier formatting across codebase - Updated issue templates and pull request templates - Fixed all remaining UI text references ## Technical Details **Breaking Changes:** - Binary name changed from `codex` to `llmx` - Config directory changed from `~/.codex/` to `~/.llmx/` - Environment variables renamed (CODEX_* → LLMX_*) - npm package renamed to `@valknar/llmx` **New Features:** - Support for 100+ LLM providers via LiteLLM - Unified authentication with LLMX_API_KEY - Enhanced model provider detection and handling - Improved error handling and fallback mechanisms **Files Changed:** - 578 files modified across Rust, TypeScript, and documentation - 30+ Rust crates renamed and updated - Complete rebrand of UI, CLI, and documentation - All tests updated and passing **Dependencies:** - Updated Cargo.lock with new package names - Updated npm dependencies in llmx-cli - Enhanced OpenAPI models for LLMX backend This release establishes LLMX as a standalone project with comprehensive LiteLLM integration, maintaining full backward compatibility with existing functionality while opening support for a wide ecosystem of LLM providers. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-Authored-By: Sebastian Krüger <support@pivoine.art>
This commit is contained in:
Sebastian Krüger
322
llmx-rs/exec/tests/suite/sandbox.rs
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322
llmx-rs/exec/tests/suite/sandbox.rs
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#![cfg(unix)]
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use llmx_core::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
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use llmx_core::spawn::StdioPolicy;
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use std::collections::HashMap;
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use std::future::Future;
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use std::io;
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use std::path::Path;
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use std::path::PathBuf;
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use std::process::ExitStatus;
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use tokio::fs::create_dir_all;
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use tokio::process::Child;
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#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
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async fn spawn_command_under_sandbox(
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command: Vec<String>,
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command_cwd: PathBuf,
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sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy,
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sandbox_cwd: &Path,
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stdio_policy: StdioPolicy,
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env: HashMap<String, String>,
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) -> std::io::Result<Child> {
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use llmx_core::seatbelt::spawn_command_under_seatbelt;
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spawn_command_under_seatbelt(
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command,
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command_cwd,
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sandbox_policy,
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sandbox_cwd,
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stdio_policy,
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env,
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)
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.await
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}
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#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
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async fn spawn_command_under_sandbox(
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command: Vec<String>,
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command_cwd: PathBuf,
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sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy,
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sandbox_cwd: &Path,
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stdio_policy: StdioPolicy,
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env: HashMap<String, String>,
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) -> std::io::Result<Child> {
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use llmx_core::landlock::spawn_command_under_linux_sandbox;
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let llmx_linux_sandbox_exe = assert_cmd::cargo::cargo_bin("llmx-exec");
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spawn_command_under_linux_sandbox(
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llmx_linux_sandbox_exe,
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command,
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command_cwd,
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sandbox_policy,
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sandbox_cwd,
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stdio_policy,
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env,
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)
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.await
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}
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#[tokio::test]
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async fn python_multiprocessing_lock_works_under_sandbox() {
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core_test_support::skip_if_sandbox!();
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#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
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let writable_roots = Vec::<PathBuf>::new();
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// From https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/sem_overview.7.html
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//
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// > On Linux, named semaphores are created in a virtual filesystem,
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// > normally mounted under /dev/shm.
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#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
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let writable_roots = vec![PathBuf::from("/dev/shm")];
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let policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
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writable_roots,
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network_access: false,
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exclude_tmpdir_env_var: false,
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exclude_slash_tmp: false,
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};
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let python_code = r#"import multiprocessing
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from multiprocessing import Lock, Process
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def f(lock):
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with lock:
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print("Lock acquired in child process")
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if __name__ == '__main__':
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lock = Lock()
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p = Process(target=f, args=(lock,))
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p.start()
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p.join()
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"#;
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let command_cwd = std::env::current_dir().expect("should be able to get current dir");
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let sandbox_cwd = command_cwd.clone();
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let mut child = spawn_command_under_sandbox(
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vec![
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"python3".to_string(),
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"-c".to_string(),
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python_code.to_string(),
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],
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command_cwd,
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&policy,
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sandbox_cwd.as_path(),
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StdioPolicy::Inherit,
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HashMap::new(),
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)
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.await
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.expect("should be able to spawn python under sandbox");
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let status = child.wait().await.expect("should wait for child process");
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assert!(status.success(), "python exited with {status:?}");
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}
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#[tokio::test]
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async fn sandbox_distinguishes_command_and_policy_cwds() {
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core_test_support::skip_if_sandbox!();
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let temp = tempfile::tempdir().expect("should be able to create temp dir");
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let sandbox_root = temp.path().join("sandbox");
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let command_root = temp.path().join("command");
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create_dir_all(&sandbox_root).await.expect("mkdir");
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create_dir_all(&command_root).await.expect("mkdir");
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let canonical_sandbox_root = tokio::fs::canonicalize(&sandbox_root)
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.await
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.expect("canonicalize sandbox root");
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let canonical_allowed_path = canonical_sandbox_root.join("allowed.txt");
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let disallowed_path = command_root.join("forbidden.txt");
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// Note writable_roots is empty: verify that `canonical_allowed_path` is
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// writable only because it is under the sandbox policy cwd, not because it
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// is under a writable root.
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let policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
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writable_roots: vec![],
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network_access: false,
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exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
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exclude_slash_tmp: true,
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};
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// Attempt to write inside the command cwd, which is outside of the sandbox policy cwd.
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let mut child = spawn_command_under_sandbox(
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vec![
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"bash".to_string(),
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"-lc".to_string(),
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"echo forbidden > forbidden.txt".to_string(),
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],
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command_root.clone(),
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&policy,
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canonical_sandbox_root.as_path(),
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StdioPolicy::Inherit,
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HashMap::new(),
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)
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.await
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.expect("should spawn command writing to forbidden path");
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let status = child
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.wait()
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.await
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.expect("should wait for forbidden command");
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assert!(
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!status.success(),
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"sandbox unexpectedly allowed writing to command cwd: {status:?}"
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);
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let forbidden_exists = tokio::fs::try_exists(&disallowed_path)
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.await
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.expect("try_exists failed");
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assert!(
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!forbidden_exists,
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"forbidden path should not have been created"
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);
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// Writing to the sandbox policy cwd after changing directories into it should succeed.
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let mut child = spawn_command_under_sandbox(
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vec![
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"/usr/bin/touch".to_string(),
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canonical_allowed_path.to_string_lossy().into_owned(),
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],
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command_root,
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&policy,
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canonical_sandbox_root.as_path(),
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StdioPolicy::Inherit,
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HashMap::new(),
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)
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.await
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.expect("should spawn command writing to sandbox root");
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let status = child.wait().await.expect("should wait for allowed command");
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assert!(
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status.success(),
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"sandbox blocked allowed write: {status:?}"
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);
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let allowed_exists = tokio::fs::try_exists(&canonical_allowed_path)
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.await
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.expect("try_exists allowed failed");
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assert!(allowed_exists, "allowed path should exist");
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}
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fn unix_sock_body() {
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unsafe {
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let mut fds = [0i32; 2];
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let r = libc::socketpair(libc::AF_UNIX, libc::SOCK_DGRAM, 0, fds.as_mut_ptr());
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assert_eq!(
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r,
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0,
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"socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM) failed: {}",
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io::Error::last_os_error()
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);
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let msg = b"hello_unix";
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// write() from one end (generic write is allowed)
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let sent = libc::write(fds[0], msg.as_ptr() as *const libc::c_void, msg.len());
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assert!(sent >= 0, "write() failed: {}", io::Error::last_os_error());
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// recvfrom() on the other end. We don’t need the address for socketpair,
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// so we pass null pointers for src address.
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let mut buf = [0u8; 64];
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let recvd = libc::recvfrom(
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fds[1],
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buf.as_mut_ptr() as *mut libc::c_void,
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buf.len(),
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0,
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std::ptr::null_mut(),
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std::ptr::null_mut(),
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);
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assert!(
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recvd >= 0,
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"recvfrom() failed: {}",
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io::Error::last_os_error()
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);
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let recvd_slice = &buf[..(recvd as usize)];
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assert_eq!(
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recvd_slice,
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&msg[..],
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"payload mismatch: sent {} bytes, got {} bytes",
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msg.len(),
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recvd
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);
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// Also exercise AF_UNIX stream socketpair quickly to ensure AF_UNIX in general works.
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let mut sfds = [0i32; 2];
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let sr = libc::socketpair(libc::AF_UNIX, libc::SOCK_STREAM, 0, sfds.as_mut_ptr());
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assert_eq!(
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sr,
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0,
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"socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM) failed: {}",
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io::Error::last_os_error()
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);
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let snt2 = libc::write(sfds[0], msg.as_ptr() as *const libc::c_void, msg.len());
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assert!(
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snt2 >= 0,
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"write(stream) failed: {}",
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io::Error::last_os_error()
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);
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let mut b2 = [0u8; 64];
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let rcv2 = libc::recv(sfds[1], b2.as_mut_ptr() as *mut libc::c_void, b2.len(), 0);
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assert!(
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rcv2 >= 0,
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"recv(stream) failed: {}",
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io::Error::last_os_error()
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);
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// Clean up
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let _ = libc::close(sfds[0]);
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let _ = libc::close(sfds[1]);
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let _ = libc::close(fds[0]);
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let _ = libc::close(fds[1]);
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}
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}
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#[tokio::test]
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async fn allow_unix_socketpair_recvfrom() {
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run_code_under_sandbox(
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"allow_unix_socketpair_recvfrom",
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&SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly,
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|| async { unix_sock_body() },
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)
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.await
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.expect("should be able to reexec");
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}
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const IN_SANDBOX_ENV_VAR: &str = "IN_SANDBOX";
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#[expect(clippy::expect_used)]
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pub async fn run_code_under_sandbox<F, Fut>(
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test_selector: &str,
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policy: &SandboxPolicy,
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child_body: F,
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) -> io::Result<Option<ExitStatus>>
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where
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F: FnOnce() -> Fut + Send + 'static,
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Fut: Future<Output = ()> + Send + 'static,
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{
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if std::env::var(IN_SANDBOX_ENV_VAR).is_err() {
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let exe = std::env::current_exe()?;
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let mut cmds = vec![exe.to_string_lossy().into_owned(), "--exact".into()];
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let mut stdio_policy = StdioPolicy::RedirectForShellTool;
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// Allow for us to pass forward --nocapture / use the right stdio policy.
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if std::env::args().any(|a| a == "--nocapture") {
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cmds.push("--nocapture".into());
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stdio_policy = StdioPolicy::Inherit;
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}
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cmds.push(test_selector.into());
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// Your existing launcher:
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let command_cwd = std::env::current_dir().expect("should be able to get current dir");
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let sandbox_cwd = command_cwd.clone();
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let mut child = spawn_command_under_sandbox(
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cmds,
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command_cwd,
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policy,
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sandbox_cwd.as_path(),
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stdio_policy,
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HashMap::from([("IN_SANDBOX".into(), "1".into())]),
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)
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.await?;
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let status = child.wait().await?;
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Ok(Some(status))
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} else {
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// Child branch: run the provided body.
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child_body().await;
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Ok(None)
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}
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}
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Reference in New Issue
Block a user