Files
llmx/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/tests/landlock.rs
Michael Bolin 0776d78357 feat: redesign sandbox config (#1373)
This is a major redesign of how sandbox configuration works and aims to
fix https://github.com/openai/codex/issues/1248. Specifically, it
replaces `sandbox_permissions` in `config.toml` (and the
`-s`/`--sandbox-permission` CLI flags) with a "table" with effectively
three variants:

```toml
# Safest option: full disk is read-only, but writes and network access are disallowed.
[sandbox]
mode = "read-only"

# The cwd of the Codex task is writable, as well as $TMPDIR on macOS.
# writable_roots can be used to specify additional writable folders.
[sandbox]
mode = "workspace-write"
writable_roots = []  # Optional, defaults to the empty list.
network_access = false  # Optional, defaults to false.

# Disable sandboxing: use at your own risk!!!
[sandbox]
mode = "danger-full-access"
```

This should make sandboxing easier to reason about. While we have
dropped support for `-s`, the way it works now is:

- no flags => `read-only`
- `--full-auto` => `workspace-write`
- currently, there is no way to specify `danger-full-access` via a CLI
flag, but we will revisit that as part of
https://github.com/openai/codex/issues/1254

Outstanding issue:

- As noted in the `TODO` on `SandboxPolicy::is_unrestricted()`, we are
still conflating sandbox preferences with approval preferences in that
case, which needs to be cleaned up.
2025-06-24 16:59:47 -07:00

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#![cfg(target_os = "linux")]
#![expect(clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used)]
use codex_core::config_types::ShellEnvironmentPolicy;
use codex_core::error::CodexErr;
use codex_core::error::SandboxErr;
use codex_core::exec::ExecParams;
use codex_core::exec::SandboxType;
use codex_core::exec::process_exec_tool_call;
use codex_core::exec_env::create_env;
use codex_core::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::path::PathBuf;
use std::sync::Arc;
use tempfile::NamedTempFile;
use tokio::sync::Notify;
// At least on GitHub CI, the arm64 tests appear to need longer timeouts.
#[cfg(not(target_arch = "aarch64"))]
const SHORT_TIMEOUT_MS: u64 = 200;
#[cfg(target_arch = "aarch64")]
const SHORT_TIMEOUT_MS: u64 = 5_000;
#[cfg(not(target_arch = "aarch64"))]
const LONG_TIMEOUT_MS: u64 = 1_000;
#[cfg(target_arch = "aarch64")]
const LONG_TIMEOUT_MS: u64 = 5_000;
#[cfg(not(target_arch = "aarch64"))]
const NETWORK_TIMEOUT_MS: u64 = 2_000;
#[cfg(target_arch = "aarch64")]
const NETWORK_TIMEOUT_MS: u64 = 10_000;
fn create_env_from_core_vars() -> HashMap<String, String> {
let policy = ShellEnvironmentPolicy::default();
create_env(&policy)
}
#[allow(clippy::print_stdout)]
async fn run_cmd(cmd: &[&str], writable_roots: &[PathBuf], timeout_ms: u64) {
let params = ExecParams {
command: cmd.iter().map(|elm| elm.to_string()).collect(),
cwd: std::env::current_dir().expect("cwd should exist"),
timeout_ms: Some(timeout_ms),
env: create_env_from_core_vars(),
};
let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: writable_roots.to_vec(),
network_access: false,
};
let sandbox_program = env!("CARGO_BIN_EXE_codex-linux-sandbox");
let codex_linux_sandbox_exe = Some(PathBuf::from(sandbox_program));
let ctrl_c = Arc::new(Notify::new());
let res = process_exec_tool_call(
params,
SandboxType::LinuxSeccomp,
ctrl_c,
&sandbox_policy,
&codex_linux_sandbox_exe,
)
.await
.unwrap();
if res.exit_code != 0 {
println!("stdout:\n{}", res.stdout);
println!("stderr:\n{}", res.stderr);
panic!("exit code: {}", res.exit_code);
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_root_read() {
run_cmd(&["ls", "-l", "/bin"], &[], SHORT_TIMEOUT_MS).await;
}
#[tokio::test]
#[should_panic]
async fn test_root_write() {
let tmpfile = NamedTempFile::new().unwrap();
let tmpfile_path = tmpfile.path().to_string_lossy();
run_cmd(
&["bash", "-lc", &format!("echo blah > {}", tmpfile_path)],
&[],
SHORT_TIMEOUT_MS,
)
.await;
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_dev_null_write() {
run_cmd(
&["bash", "-lc", "echo blah > /dev/null"],
&[],
// We have seen timeouts when running this test in CI on GitHub,
// so we are using a generous timeout until we can diagnose further.
LONG_TIMEOUT_MS,
)
.await;
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_writable_root() {
let tmpdir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
let file_path = tmpdir.path().join("test");
run_cmd(
&[
"bash",
"-lc",
&format!("echo blah > {}", file_path.to_string_lossy()),
],
&[tmpdir.path().to_path_buf()],
// We have seen timeouts when running this test in CI on GitHub,
// so we are using a generous timeout until we can diagnose further.
LONG_TIMEOUT_MS,
)
.await;
}
#[tokio::test]
#[should_panic(expected = "Sandbox(Timeout)")]
async fn test_timeout() {
run_cmd(&["sleep", "2"], &[], 50).await;
}
/// Helper that runs `cmd` under the Linux sandbox and asserts that the command
/// does NOT succeed (i.e. returns a nonzero exit code) **unless** the binary
/// is missing in which case we silently treat it as an accepted skip so the
/// suite remains green on leaner CI images.
async fn assert_network_blocked(cmd: &[&str]) {
let cwd = std::env::current_dir().expect("cwd should exist");
let params = ExecParams {
command: cmd.iter().map(|s| s.to_string()).collect(),
cwd,
// Give the tool a generous 2-second timeout so even slow DNS timeouts
// do not stall the suite.
timeout_ms: Some(NETWORK_TIMEOUT_MS),
env: create_env_from_core_vars(),
};
let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
let ctrl_c = Arc::new(Notify::new());
let sandbox_program = env!("CARGO_BIN_EXE_codex-linux-sandbox");
let codex_linux_sandbox_exe: Option<PathBuf> = Some(PathBuf::from(sandbox_program));
let result = process_exec_tool_call(
params,
SandboxType::LinuxSeccomp,
ctrl_c,
&sandbox_policy,
&codex_linux_sandbox_exe,
)
.await;
let (exit_code, stdout, stderr) = match result {
Ok(output) => (output.exit_code, output.stdout, output.stderr),
Err(CodexErr::Sandbox(SandboxErr::Denied(exit_code, stdout, stderr))) => {
(exit_code, stdout, stderr)
}
_ => {
panic!("expected sandbox denied error, got: {:?}", result);
}
};
dbg!(&stderr);
dbg!(&stdout);
dbg!(&exit_code);
// A completely missing binary exits with 127. Anything else should also
// be nonzero (EPERM from seccomp will usually bubble up as 1, 2, 13…)
// If—*and only if*—the command exits 0 we consider the sandbox breached.
if exit_code == 0 {
panic!(
"Network sandbox FAILED - {:?} exited 0\nstdout:\n{}\nstderr:\n{}",
cmd, stdout, stderr
);
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn sandbox_blocks_curl() {
assert_network_blocked(&["curl", "-I", "http://openai.com"]).await;
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn sandbox_blocks_wget() {
assert_network_blocked(&["wget", "-qO-", "http://openai.com"]).await;
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn sandbox_blocks_ping() {
// ICMP requires raw socket should be denied quickly with EPERM.
assert_network_blocked(&["ping", "-c", "1", "8.8.8.8"]).await;
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn sandbox_blocks_nc() {
// Zerolength connection attempt to localhost.
assert_network_blocked(&["nc", "-z", "127.0.0.1", "80"]).await;
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn sandbox_blocks_ssh() {
// Force ssh to attempt a real TCP connection but fail quickly. `BatchMode`
// avoids password prompts, and `ConnectTimeout` keeps the hang time low.
assert_network_blocked(&[
"ssh",
"-o",
"BatchMode=yes",
"-o",
"ConnectTimeout=1",
"github.com",
])
.await;
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn sandbox_blocks_getent() {
assert_network_blocked(&["getent", "ahosts", "openai.com"]).await;
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn sandbox_blocks_dev_tcp_redirection() {
// This syntax is only supported by bash and zsh. We try bash first.
// Fallback generic socket attempt using /bin/sh with bashstyle /dev/tcp. Not
// all images ship bash, so we guard against 127 as well.
assert_network_blocked(&["bash", "-c", "echo hi > /dev/tcp/127.0.0.1/80"]).await;
}