Files
llmx/codex-rs/core/src/is_safe_command.rs
Michael Bolin a1641743a8 feat: expand the set of commands that can be safely identified as "trusted" (#1668)
This PR updates `is_known_safe_command()` to account for "safe
operators" to expand the set of commands that can be run without
approval. This concept existed in the TypeScript CLI, and we are
[finally!] porting it to the Rust one:


c9e2def494/codex-cli/src/approvals.ts (L531-L541)

The idea is that if we have `EXPR1 SAFE_OP EXPR2` and `EXPR1` and
`EXPR2` are considered safe independently, then `EXPR1 SAFE_OP EXPR2`
should be considered safe. Currently, `SAFE_OP` includes `&&`, `||`,
`;`, and `|`.

In the TypeScript implementation, we relied on
https://www.npmjs.com/package/shell-quote to parse the string of Bash,
as it could provide a "lightweight" parse tree, parsing `'beep || boop >
/byte'` as:

```
[ 'beep', { op: '||' }, 'boop', { op: '>' }, '/byte' ]
```

Though in this PR, we introduce the use of
https://crates.io/crates/tree-sitter-bash for parsing (which
incidentally we were already using in
[`codex-apply-patch`](c9e2def494/codex-rs/apply-patch/Cargo.toml (L18))),
which gives us a richer parse tree. (Incidentally, if you have never
played with tree-sitter, try the
[playground](https://tree-sitter.github.io/tree-sitter/7-playground.html)
and select **Bash** from the dropdown to see how it parses various
expressions.)

As a concrete example, prior to this change, our implementation of
`is_known_safe_command()` could verify things like:

```
["bash", "-lc", "grep -R \"Cargo.toml\" -n"]
```

but not:

```
["bash", "-lc", "grep -R \"Cargo.toml\" -n || true"]
```

With this change, the version with `|| true` is also accepted.

Admittedly, this PR does not expand the safety check to support
subshells, so it would reject, e.g. `bash -lc 'ls || (pwd && echo hi)'`,
but that can be addressed in a subsequent PR.
2025-07-24 14:13:30 -07:00

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use crate::bash::try_parse_bash;
use crate::bash::try_parse_word_only_commands_sequence;
pub fn is_known_safe_command(command: &[String]) -> bool {
if is_safe_to_call_with_exec(command) {
return true;
}
// Support `bash -lc "..."` where the script consists solely of one or
// more "plain" commands (only bare words / quoted strings) combined with
// a conservative allowlist of shell operators that themselves do not
// introduce side effects ( "&&", "||", ";", and "|" ). If every
// individual command in the script is itself a knownsafe command, then
// the composite expression is considered safe.
if let [bash, flag, script] = command {
if bash == "bash" && flag == "-lc" {
if let Some(tree) = try_parse_bash(script) {
if let Some(all_commands) = try_parse_word_only_commands_sequence(&tree, script) {
if !all_commands.is_empty()
&& all_commands
.iter()
.all(|cmd| is_safe_to_call_with_exec(cmd))
{
return true;
}
}
}
}
}
false
}
fn is_safe_to_call_with_exec(command: &[String]) -> bool {
let cmd0 = command.first().map(String::as_str);
match cmd0 {
#[rustfmt::skip]
Some(
"cat" |
"cd" |
"echo" |
"false" |
"grep" |
"head" |
"ls" |
"nl" |
"pwd" |
"tail" |
"true" |
"wc" |
"which") => {
true
},
Some("find") => {
// Certain options to `find` can delete files, write to files, or
// execute arbitrary commands, so we cannot auto-approve the
// invocation of `find` in such cases.
#[rustfmt::skip]
const UNSAFE_FIND_OPTIONS: &[&str] = &[
// Options that can execute arbitrary commands.
"-exec", "-execdir", "-ok", "-okdir",
// Option that deletes matching files.
"-delete",
// Options that write pathnames to a file.
"-fls", "-fprint", "-fprint0", "-fprintf",
];
!command
.iter()
.any(|arg| UNSAFE_FIND_OPTIONS.contains(&arg.as_str()))
}
// Ripgrep
Some("rg") => {
const UNSAFE_RIPGREP_OPTIONS_WITH_ARGS: &[&str] = &[
// Takes an arbitrary command that is executed for each match.
"--pre",
// Takes a command that can be used to obtain the local hostname.
"--hostname-bin",
];
const UNSAFE_RIPGREP_OPTIONS_WITHOUT_ARGS: &[&str] = &[
// Calls out to other decompression tools, so do not auto-approve
// out of an abundance of caution.
"--search-zip",
"-z",
];
!command.iter().any(|arg| {
UNSAFE_RIPGREP_OPTIONS_WITHOUT_ARGS.contains(&arg.as_str())
|| UNSAFE_RIPGREP_OPTIONS_WITH_ARGS
.iter()
.any(|&opt| arg == opt || arg.starts_with(&format!("{opt}=")))
})
}
// Git
Some("git") => matches!(
command.get(1).map(String::as_str),
Some("branch" | "status" | "log" | "diff" | "show")
),
// Rust
Some("cargo") if command.get(1).map(String::as_str) == Some("check") => true,
// Special-case `sed -n {N|M,N}p FILE`
Some("sed")
if {
command.len() == 4
&& command.get(1).map(String::as_str) == Some("-n")
&& is_valid_sed_n_arg(command.get(2).map(String::as_str))
&& command.get(3).map(String::is_empty) == Some(false)
} =>
{
true
}
// ── anything else ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
_ => false,
}
}
// (bash parsing helpers implemented in crate::bash)
/* ----------------------------------------------------------
Example
---------------------------------------------------------- */
/// Returns true if `arg` matches /^(\d+,)?\d+p$/
fn is_valid_sed_n_arg(arg: Option<&str>) -> bool {
// unwrap or bail
let s = match arg {
Some(s) => s,
None => return false,
};
// must end with 'p', strip it
let core = match s.strip_suffix('p') {
Some(rest) => rest,
None => return false,
};
// split on ',' and ensure 1 or 2 numeric parts
let parts: Vec<&str> = core.split(',').collect();
match parts.as_slice() {
// single number, e.g. "10"
[num] => !num.is_empty() && num.chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_digit()),
// two numbers, e.g. "1,5"
[a, b] => {
!a.is_empty()
&& !b.is_empty()
&& a.chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_digit())
&& b.chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_digit())
}
// anything else (more than one comma) is invalid
_ => false,
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
#![allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]
use super::*;
fn vec_str(args: &[&str]) -> Vec<String> {
args.iter().map(|s| s.to_string()).collect()
}
#[test]
fn known_safe_examples() {
assert!(is_safe_to_call_with_exec(&vec_str(&["ls"])));
assert!(is_safe_to_call_with_exec(&vec_str(&["git", "status"])));
assert!(is_safe_to_call_with_exec(&vec_str(&[
"sed", "-n", "1,5p", "file.txt"
])));
assert!(is_safe_to_call_with_exec(&vec_str(&[
"nl",
"-nrz",
"Cargo.toml"
])));
// Safe `find` command (no unsafe options).
assert!(is_safe_to_call_with_exec(&vec_str(&[
"find", ".", "-name", "file.txt"
])));
}
#[test]
fn unknown_or_partial() {
assert!(!is_safe_to_call_with_exec(&vec_str(&["foo"])));
assert!(!is_safe_to_call_with_exec(&vec_str(&["git", "fetch"])));
assert!(!is_safe_to_call_with_exec(&vec_str(&[
"sed", "-n", "xp", "file.txt"
])));
// Unsafe `find` commands.
for args in [
vec_str(&["find", ".", "-name", "file.txt", "-exec", "rm", "{}", ";"]),
vec_str(&[
"find", ".", "-name", "*.py", "-execdir", "python3", "{}", ";",
]),
vec_str(&["find", ".", "-name", "file.txt", "-ok", "rm", "{}", ";"]),
vec_str(&["find", ".", "-name", "*.py", "-okdir", "python3", "{}", ";"]),
vec_str(&["find", ".", "-delete", "-name", "file.txt"]),
vec_str(&["find", ".", "-fls", "/etc/passwd"]),
vec_str(&["find", ".", "-fprint", "/etc/passwd"]),
vec_str(&["find", ".", "-fprint0", "/etc/passwd"]),
vec_str(&["find", ".", "-fprintf", "/root/suid.txt", "%#m %u %p\n"]),
] {
assert!(
!is_safe_to_call_with_exec(&args),
"expected {args:?} to be unsafe"
);
}
}
#[test]
fn ripgrep_rules() {
// Safe ripgrep invocations none of the unsafe flags are present.
assert!(is_safe_to_call_with_exec(&vec_str(&[
"rg",
"Cargo.toml",
"-n"
])));
// Unsafe flags that do not take an argument (present verbatim).
for args in [
vec_str(&["rg", "--search-zip", "files"]),
vec_str(&["rg", "-z", "files"]),
] {
assert!(
!is_safe_to_call_with_exec(&args),
"expected {args:?} to be considered unsafe due to zip-search flag",
);
}
// Unsafe flags that expect a value, provided in both split and = forms.
for args in [
vec_str(&["rg", "--pre", "pwned", "files"]),
vec_str(&["rg", "--pre=pwned", "files"]),
vec_str(&["rg", "--hostname-bin", "pwned", "files"]),
vec_str(&["rg", "--hostname-bin=pwned", "files"]),
] {
assert!(
!is_safe_to_call_with_exec(&args),
"expected {args:?} to be considered unsafe due to external-command flag",
);
}
}
#[test]
fn bash_lc_safe_examples() {
assert!(is_known_safe_command(&vec_str(&["bash", "-lc", "ls"])));
assert!(is_known_safe_command(&vec_str(&["bash", "-lc", "ls -1"])));
assert!(is_known_safe_command(&vec_str(&[
"bash",
"-lc",
"git status"
])));
assert!(is_known_safe_command(&vec_str(&[
"bash",
"-lc",
"grep -R \"Cargo.toml\" -n"
])));
assert!(is_known_safe_command(&vec_str(&[
"bash",
"-lc",
"sed -n 1,5p file.txt"
])));
assert!(is_known_safe_command(&vec_str(&[
"bash",
"-lc",
"sed -n '1,5p' file.txt"
])));
assert!(is_known_safe_command(&vec_str(&[
"bash",
"-lc",
"find . -name file.txt"
])));
}
#[test]
fn bash_lc_safe_examples_with_operators() {
assert!(is_known_safe_command(&vec_str(&[
"bash",
"-lc",
"grep -R \"Cargo.toml\" -n || true"
])));
assert!(is_known_safe_command(&vec_str(&[
"bash",
"-lc",
"ls && pwd"
])));
assert!(is_known_safe_command(&vec_str(&[
"bash",
"-lc",
"echo 'hi' ; ls"
])));
assert!(is_known_safe_command(&vec_str(&[
"bash",
"-lc",
"ls | wc -l"
])));
}
#[test]
fn bash_lc_unsafe_examples() {
assert!(
!is_known_safe_command(&vec_str(&["bash", "-lc", "git", "status"])),
"Four arg version is not known to be safe."
);
assert!(
!is_known_safe_command(&vec_str(&["bash", "-lc", "'git status'"])),
"The extra quoting around 'git status' makes it a program named 'git status' and is therefore unsafe."
);
assert!(
!is_known_safe_command(&vec_str(&["bash", "-lc", "find . -name file.txt -delete"])),
"Unsafe find option should not be auto-approved."
);
// Disallowed because of unsafe command in sequence.
assert!(
!is_known_safe_command(&vec_str(&["bash", "-lc", "ls && rm -rf /"])),
"Sequence containing unsafe command must be rejected"
);
// Disallowed because of parentheses / subshell.
assert!(
!is_known_safe_command(&vec_str(&["bash", "-lc", "(ls)"])),
"Parentheses (subshell) are not provably safe with the current parser"
);
assert!(
!is_known_safe_command(&vec_str(&["bash", "-lc", "ls || (pwd && echo hi)"])),
"Nested parentheses are not provably safe with the current parser"
);
// Disallowed redirection.
assert!(
!is_known_safe_command(&vec_str(&["bash", "-lc", "ls > out.txt"])),
"> redirection should be rejected"
);
}
}