Files
llmx/codex-rs/core/tests/suite/seatbelt.rs
2025-10-02 21:09:21 +00:00

243 lines
8.0 KiB
Rust
Raw Blame History

This file contains ambiguous Unicode characters
This file contains Unicode characters that might be confused with other characters. If you think that this is intentional, you can safely ignore this warning. Use the Escape button to reveal them.
#![cfg(target_os = "macos")]
//! Tests for the macOS sandboxing that are specific to Seatbelt.
//! Tests that apply to both Mac and Linux sandboxing should go in sandbox.rs.
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::path::Path;
use std::path::PathBuf;
use codex_core::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
use codex_core::seatbelt::spawn_command_under_seatbelt;
use codex_core::spawn::CODEX_SANDBOX_ENV_VAR;
use codex_core::spawn::StdioPolicy;
use tempfile::TempDir;
struct TestScenario {
repo_parent: PathBuf,
file_outside_repo: PathBuf,
repo_root: PathBuf,
file_in_repo_root: PathBuf,
file_in_dot_git_dir: PathBuf,
}
struct TestExpectations {
file_outside_repo_is_writable: bool,
file_in_repo_root_is_writable: bool,
file_in_dot_git_dir_is_writable: bool,
}
impl TestScenario {
async fn run_test(&self, policy: &SandboxPolicy, expectations: TestExpectations) {
if std::env::var(CODEX_SANDBOX_ENV_VAR) == Ok("seatbelt".to_string()) {
eprintln!("{CODEX_SANDBOX_ENV_VAR} is set to 'seatbelt', skipping test.");
return;
}
assert_eq!(
touch(&self.file_outside_repo, policy).await,
expectations.file_outside_repo_is_writable
);
assert_eq!(
self.file_outside_repo.exists(),
expectations.file_outside_repo_is_writable
);
assert_eq!(
touch(&self.file_in_repo_root, policy).await,
expectations.file_in_repo_root_is_writable
);
assert_eq!(
self.file_in_repo_root.exists(),
expectations.file_in_repo_root_is_writable
);
assert_eq!(
touch(&self.file_in_dot_git_dir, policy).await,
expectations.file_in_dot_git_dir_is_writable
);
assert_eq!(
self.file_in_dot_git_dir.exists(),
expectations.file_in_dot_git_dir_is_writable
);
}
}
/// If the user has added a workspace root that is not a Git repo root, then
/// the user has to specify `--skip-git-repo-check` or go through some
/// interstitial that indicates they are taking on some risk because Git
/// cannot be used to backup their work before the agent begins.
///
/// Because the user has agreed to this risk, we do not try find all .git
/// folders in the workspace and block them (though we could change our
/// position on this in the future).
#[tokio::test]
async fn if_parent_of_repo_is_writable_then_dot_git_folder_is_writable() {
let tmp = TempDir::new().expect("should be able to create temp dir");
let test_scenario = create_test_scenario(&tmp);
let policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: vec![test_scenario.repo_parent.clone()],
network_access: false,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
exclude_slash_tmp: true,
};
test_scenario
.run_test(
&policy,
TestExpectations {
file_outside_repo_is_writable: true,
file_in_repo_root_is_writable: true,
file_in_dot_git_dir_is_writable: true,
},
)
.await;
}
/// When the writable root is the root of a Git repository (as evidenced by the
/// presence of a .git folder), then the .git folder should be read-only if
/// the policy is `WorkspaceWrite`.
#[tokio::test]
async fn if_git_repo_is_writable_root_then_dot_git_folder_is_read_only() {
let tmp = TempDir::new().expect("should be able to create temp dir");
let test_scenario = create_test_scenario(&tmp);
let policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: vec![test_scenario.repo_root.clone()],
network_access: false,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
exclude_slash_tmp: true,
};
test_scenario
.run_test(
&policy,
TestExpectations {
file_outside_repo_is_writable: false,
file_in_repo_root_is_writable: true,
file_in_dot_git_dir_is_writable: false,
},
)
.await;
}
/// Under DangerFullAccess, all writes should be permitted anywhere on disk,
/// including inside the .git folder.
#[tokio::test]
async fn danger_full_access_allows_all_writes() {
let tmp = TempDir::new().expect("should be able to create temp dir");
let test_scenario = create_test_scenario(&tmp);
let policy = SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess;
test_scenario
.run_test(
&policy,
TestExpectations {
file_outside_repo_is_writable: true,
file_in_repo_root_is_writable: true,
file_in_dot_git_dir_is_writable: true,
},
)
.await;
}
/// Under ReadOnly, writes should not be permitted anywhere on disk.
#[tokio::test]
async fn read_only_forbids_all_writes() {
let tmp = TempDir::new().expect("should be able to create temp dir");
let test_scenario = create_test_scenario(&tmp);
let policy = SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly;
test_scenario
.run_test(
&policy,
TestExpectations {
file_outside_repo_is_writable: false,
file_in_repo_root_is_writable: false,
file_in_dot_git_dir_is_writable: false,
},
)
.await;
}
/// Verify that user lookups via `pwd.getpwuid(os.getuid())` work under the
/// seatbelt sandbox. Prior to allowing the necessary machlookup for
/// OpenDirectory libinfo, this would fail with `KeyError: getpwuid(): uid not found`.
#[tokio::test]
async fn python_getpwuid_works_under_seatbelt() {
if std::env::var(CODEX_SANDBOX_ENV_VAR) == Ok("seatbelt".to_string()) {
eprintln!("{CODEX_SANDBOX_ENV_VAR} is set to 'seatbelt', skipping test.");
return;
}
// ReadOnly is sufficient here since we are only exercising user lookup.
let policy = SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly;
let command_cwd = std::env::current_dir().expect("getcwd");
let sandbox_cwd = command_cwd.clone();
let mut child = spawn_command_under_seatbelt(
vec![
"python3".to_string(),
"-c".to_string(),
// Print the passwd struct; success implies lookup worked.
"import pwd, os; print(pwd.getpwuid(os.getuid()))".to_string(),
],
command_cwd,
&policy,
sandbox_cwd.as_path(),
StdioPolicy::RedirectForShellTool,
HashMap::new(),
)
.await
.expect("should be able to spawn python under seatbelt");
let status = child
.wait()
.await
.expect("should be able to wait for child process");
assert!(status.success(), "python exited with {status:?}");
}
#[expect(clippy::expect_used)]
fn create_test_scenario(tmp: &TempDir) -> TestScenario {
let repo_parent = tmp.path().to_path_buf();
let repo_root = repo_parent.join("repo");
let dot_git_dir = repo_root.join(".git");
std::fs::create_dir(&repo_root).expect("should be able to create repo root");
std::fs::create_dir(&dot_git_dir).expect("should be able to create .git dir");
TestScenario {
file_outside_repo: repo_parent.join("outside.txt"),
repo_parent,
file_in_repo_root: repo_root.join("repo_file.txt"),
repo_root,
file_in_dot_git_dir: dot_git_dir.join("dot_git_file.txt"),
}
}
#[expect(clippy::expect_used)]
/// Note that `path` must be absolute.
async fn touch(path: &Path, policy: &SandboxPolicy) -> bool {
assert!(path.is_absolute(), "Path must be absolute: {path:?}");
let command_cwd = std::env::current_dir().expect("getcwd");
let sandbox_cwd = command_cwd.clone();
let mut child = spawn_command_under_seatbelt(
vec![
"/usr/bin/touch".to_string(),
path.to_string_lossy().to_string(),
],
command_cwd,
policy,
sandbox_cwd.as_path(),
StdioPolicy::RedirectForShellTool,
HashMap::new(),
)
.await
.expect("should be able to spawn command under seatbelt");
child
.wait()
.await
.expect("should be able to wait for child process")
.success()
}