Files
llmx/codex-rs/exec/tests/sandbox.rs
Parker Thompson c26d42ab69 Fix AF_UNIX, sockpair, recvfrom in linux sandbox (#2309)
When using codex-tui on a linux system I was unable to run `cargo
clippy` inside of codex due to:
```
[pid 3548377] socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_SEQPACKET|SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0,  <unfinished ...>
[pid 3548370] close(8 <unfinished ...>
[pid 3548377] <... socketpair resumed>0x7ffb97f4ed60) = -1 EPERM (Operation not permitted)
```
And
```
3611300 <... recvfrom resumed>0x708b8b5cffe0, 8, 0, NULL, NULL) = -1 EPERM (Operation not permitted)
```

This PR:
* Fixes a bug that disallowed AF_UNIX to allow it on `socket()`
* Adds recvfrom() to the syscall allow list, this should be fine since
we disable opening new sockets. But we should validate there is not a
open socket inheritance issue.
* Allow socketpair to be called for AF_UNIX
* Adds tests for AF_UNIX components
* All of which allows running `cargo clippy` within the sandbox on
linux, and possibly other tooling using a fork server model + AF_UNIX
comms.
2025-08-14 17:12:41 -07:00

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#![cfg(unix)]
#![expect(clippy::expect_used)]
use codex_core::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
use codex_core::spawn::StdioPolicy;
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::future::Future;
use std::io;
use std::path::PathBuf;
use std::process::ExitStatus;
use tokio::process::Child;
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
async fn spawn_command_under_sandbox(
command: Vec<String>,
sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy,
cwd: PathBuf,
stdio_policy: StdioPolicy,
env: HashMap<String, String>,
) -> std::io::Result<Child> {
use codex_core::seatbelt::spawn_command_under_seatbelt;
spawn_command_under_seatbelt(command, sandbox_policy, cwd, stdio_policy, env).await
}
#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
async fn spawn_command_under_sandbox(
command: Vec<String>,
sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy,
cwd: PathBuf,
stdio_policy: StdioPolicy,
env: HashMap<String, String>,
) -> std::io::Result<Child> {
use codex_core::landlock::spawn_command_under_linux_sandbox;
let codex_linux_sandbox_exe = assert_cmd::cargo::cargo_bin("codex-exec");
spawn_command_under_linux_sandbox(
codex_linux_sandbox_exe,
command,
sandbox_policy,
cwd,
stdio_policy,
env,
)
.await
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn python_multiprocessing_lock_works_under_sandbox() {
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
let writable_roots = Vec::<PathBuf>::new();
// From https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/sem_overview.7.html
//
// > On Linux, named semaphores are created in a virtual filesystem,
// > normally mounted under /dev/shm.
#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
let writable_roots = vec![PathBuf::from("/dev/shm")];
let policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots,
network_access: false,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: false,
exclude_slash_tmp: false,
};
let python_code = r#"import multiprocessing
from multiprocessing import Lock, Process
def f(lock):
with lock:
print("Lock acquired in child process")
if __name__ == '__main__':
lock = Lock()
p = Process(target=f, args=(lock,))
p.start()
p.join()
"#;
let mut child = spawn_command_under_sandbox(
vec![
"python3".to_string(),
"-c".to_string(),
python_code.to_string(),
],
&policy,
std::env::current_dir().expect("should be able to get current dir"),
StdioPolicy::Inherit,
HashMap::new(),
)
.await
.expect("should be able to spawn python under sandbox");
let status = child.wait().await.expect("should wait for child process");
assert!(status.success(), "python exited with {status:?}");
}
fn unix_sock_body() {
unsafe {
let mut fds = [0i32; 2];
let r = libc::socketpair(libc::AF_UNIX, libc::SOCK_DGRAM, 0, fds.as_mut_ptr());
assert_eq!(
r,
0,
"socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM) failed: {}",
io::Error::last_os_error()
);
let msg = b"hello_unix";
// write() from one end (generic write is allowed)
let sent = libc::write(fds[0], msg.as_ptr() as *const libc::c_void, msg.len());
assert!(sent >= 0, "write() failed: {}", io::Error::last_os_error());
// recvfrom() on the other end. We dont need the address for socketpair,
// so we pass null pointers for src address.
let mut buf = [0u8; 64];
let recvd = libc::recvfrom(
fds[1],
buf.as_mut_ptr() as *mut libc::c_void,
buf.len(),
0,
std::ptr::null_mut(),
std::ptr::null_mut(),
);
assert!(
recvd >= 0,
"recvfrom() failed: {}",
io::Error::last_os_error()
);
let recvd_slice = &buf[..(recvd as usize)];
assert_eq!(
recvd_slice,
&msg[..],
"payload mismatch: sent {} bytes, got {} bytes",
msg.len(),
recvd
);
// Also exercise AF_UNIX stream socketpair quickly to ensure AF_UNIX in general works.
let mut sfds = [0i32; 2];
let sr = libc::socketpair(libc::AF_UNIX, libc::SOCK_STREAM, 0, sfds.as_mut_ptr());
assert_eq!(
sr,
0,
"socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM) failed: {}",
io::Error::last_os_error()
);
let snt2 = libc::write(sfds[0], msg.as_ptr() as *const libc::c_void, msg.len());
assert!(
snt2 >= 0,
"write(stream) failed: {}",
io::Error::last_os_error()
);
let mut b2 = [0u8; 64];
let rcv2 = libc::recv(sfds[1], b2.as_mut_ptr() as *mut libc::c_void, b2.len(), 0);
assert!(
rcv2 >= 0,
"recv(stream) failed: {}",
io::Error::last_os_error()
);
// Clean up
let _ = libc::close(sfds[0]);
let _ = libc::close(sfds[1]);
let _ = libc::close(fds[0]);
let _ = libc::close(fds[1]);
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn allow_unix_socketpair_recvfrom() {
run_code_under_sandbox(
"allow_unix_socketpair_recvfrom",
&SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly,
|| async { unix_sock_body() },
)
.await
.expect("should be able to reexec");
}
const IN_SANDBOX_ENV_VAR: &str = "IN_SANDBOX";
pub async fn run_code_under_sandbox<F, Fut>(
test_selector: &str,
policy: &SandboxPolicy,
child_body: F,
) -> io::Result<Option<ExitStatus>>
where
F: FnOnce() -> Fut + Send + 'static,
Fut: Future<Output = ()> + Send + 'static,
{
if std::env::var(IN_SANDBOX_ENV_VAR).is_err() {
let exe = std::env::current_exe()?;
let mut cmds = vec![exe.to_string_lossy().into_owned(), "--exact".into()];
let mut stdio_policy = StdioPolicy::RedirectForShellTool;
// Allow for us to pass forward --nocapture / use the right stdio policy.
if std::env::args().any(|a| a == "--nocapture") {
cmds.push("--nocapture".into());
stdio_policy = StdioPolicy::Inherit;
}
cmds.push(test_selector.into());
// Your existing launcher:
let mut child = spawn_command_under_sandbox(
cmds,
policy,
std::env::current_dir().expect("should be able to get current dir"),
stdio_policy,
HashMap::from([("IN_SANDBOX".into(), "1".into())]),
)
.await?;
let status = child.wait().await?;
Ok(Some(status))
} else {
// Child branch: run the provided body.
child_body().await;
Ok(None)
}
}