llmx/codex-rs/responses-api-proxy

codex-responses-api-proxy

A strict HTTP proxy that only forwards POST requests to /v1/responses to the OpenAI API (https://api.openai.com), injecting the Authorization: Bearer $OPENAI_API_KEY header. Everything else is rejected with 403 Forbidden.

Expected Usage

IMPORTANT: codex-responses-api-proxy is designed to be run by a privileged user with access to OPENAI_API_KEY so that an unprivileged user cannot inspect or tamper with the process. Though if --http-shutdown is specified, an unprivileged user can make a GET request to /shutdown to shutdown the server, as an unprivileged user could not send SIGTERM to kill the process.

A privileged user (i.e., root or a user with sudo) who has access to OPENAI_API_KEY would run the following to start the server, as codex-responses-api-proxy reads the auth token from stdin:

printenv OPENAI_API_KEY | env -u OPENAI_API_KEY codex-responses-api-proxy --http-shutdown --server-info /tmp/server-info.json

A non-privileged user would then run Codex as follows, specifying the model_provider dynamically:

PROXY_PORT=$(jq .port /tmp/server-info.json)
PROXY_BASE_URL="http://127.0.0.1:${PROXY_PORT}"
codex exec -c "model_providers.openai-proxy={ name = 'OpenAI Proxy', base_url = '${PROXY_BASE_URL}/v1', wire_api='responses' }" \
    -c model_provider="openai-proxy" \
    'Your prompt here'

When the unprivileged user was finished, they could shutdown the server using curl (since kill -SIGTERM is not an option):

curl --fail --silent --show-error "${PROXY_BASE_URL}/shutdown"

Behavior

• Reads the API key from stdin. All callers should pipe the key in (for example, printenv OPENAI_API_KEY | codex-responses-api-proxy).
• Formats the header value as Bearer <key> and attempts to mlock(2) the memory holding that header so it is not swapped to disk.
• Listens on the provided port or an ephemeral port if --port is not specified.
• Accepts exactly POST /v1/responses (no query string). The request body is forwarded to https://api.openai.com/v1/responses with Authorization: Bearer <key> set. All original request headers (except any incoming Authorization) are forwarded upstream. For other requests, it responds with 403.
• Optionally writes a single-line JSON file with server info, currently { "port": <u16> }.
• Optional --http-shutdown enables GET /shutdown to terminate the process with exit code 0. This allows one user (e.g., root) to start the proxy and another unprivileged user on the host to shut it down.

CLI

codex-responses-api-proxy [--port <PORT>] [--server-info <FILE>] [--http-shutdown]

• --port <PORT>: Port to bind on 127.0.0.1. If omitted, an ephemeral port is chosen.
• --server-info <FILE>: If set, the proxy writes a single line of JSON with { "port": <PORT>, "pid": <PID> } once listening.
• --http-shutdown: If set, enables GET /shutdown to exit the process with code 0.

Notes

• Only POST /v1/responses is permitted. No query strings are allowed.
• All request headers are forwarded to the upstream call (aside from overriding Authorization). Response status and content-type are mirrored from upstream.

Hardening Details

Care is taken to restrict access/copying to the value of OPENAI_API_KEY retained in memory:

• We leverage codex_process_hardening so codex-responses-api-proxy is run with standard process-hardening techniques.
• At startup, we allocate a 1024 byte buffer on the stack and write "Bearer " as the first 7 bytes.
• We then read from stdin, copying the contents into the buffer after "Bearer ".
• After verifying the key matches /^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$/ (and does not exceed the buffer), we create a String from that buffer (so the data is now on the heap).
• We zero out the stack-allocated buffer using https://crates.io/crates/zeroize so it is not optimized away by the compiler.
• We invoke .leak() on the String so we can treat its contents as a &'static str, as it will live for the rest of the process.
• On UNIX, we mlock(2) the memory backing the &'static str.
• When using the &'static str when building an HTTP request, we use HeaderValue::from_static() to avoid copying the &str.
• We also invoke .set_sensitive(true) on the HeaderValue, which in theory indicates to other parts of the HTTP stack that the header should be treated with "special care" to avoid leakage:

439d1c50d7/src/header/value.rs (L346-L376)