Files
llmx/codex-rs/core/src/protocol.rs
Michael Bolin b323d10ea7 feat: add ZDR support to Rust implementation (#642)
This adds support for the `--disable-response-storage` flag across our
multiple Rust CLIs to support customers who have opted into Zero-Data
Retention (ZDR). The analogous changes to the TypeScript CLI were:

* https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/481
* https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/543

For a client using ZDR, `previous_response_id` will never be available,
so the `input` field of an API request must include the full transcript
of the conversation thus far. As such, this PR changes the type of
`Prompt.input` from `Vec<ResponseInputItem>` to `Vec<ResponseItem>`.

Practically speaking, `ResponseItem` was effectively a "superset" of
`ResponseInputItem` already. The main difference for us is that
`ResponseItem` includes the `FunctionCall` variant that we have to
include as part of the conversation history in the ZDR case.

Another key change in this PR is modifying `try_run_turn()` so that it
returns the `Vec<ResponseItem>` for the turn in addition to the
`Vec<ResponseInputItem>` produced by `try_run_turn()`. This is because
the caller of `run_turn()` needs to record the `Vec<ResponseItem>` when
ZDR is enabled.

To that end, this PR introduces `ZdrTranscript` (and adds
`zdr_transcript: Option<ZdrTranscript>` to `struct State` in `codex.rs`)
to take responsibility for maintaining the conversation transcript in
the ZDR case.
2025-04-25 12:08:18 -07:00

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//! Defines the protocol for a Codex session between a client and an agent.
//!
//! Uses a SQ (Submission Queue) / EQ (Event Queue) pattern to asynchronously communicate
//! between user and agent.
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::path::PathBuf;
use serde::Deserialize;
use serde::Serialize;
/// Submission Queue Entry - requests from user
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize, Serialize)]
pub struct Submission {
/// Unique id for this Submission to correlate with Events
pub id: String,
/// Payload
pub op: Op,
}
/// Submission operation
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize, Serialize)]
#[serde(tag = "type", rename_all = "snake_case")]
#[non_exhaustive]
pub enum Op {
/// Configure the model session.
ConfigureSession {
/// If not specified, server will use its default model.
model: Option<String>,
/// Model instructions
instructions: Option<String>,
/// When to escalate for approval for execution
approval_policy: AskForApproval,
/// How to sandbox commands executed in the system
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy,
/// Disable server-side response storage (send full context each request)
#[serde(default)]
disable_response_storage: bool,
},
/// Abort current task.
/// This server sends no corresponding Event
Interrupt,
/// Input from the user
UserInput {
/// User input items, see `InputItem`
items: Vec<InputItem>,
},
/// Approve a command execution
ExecApproval {
/// The id of the submission we are approving
id: String,
/// The user's decision in response to the request.
decision: ReviewDecision,
},
/// Approve a code patch
PatchApproval {
/// The id of the submission we are approving
id: String,
/// The user's decision in response to the request.
decision: ReviewDecision,
},
}
/// Determines how liberally commands are autoapproved by the system.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub enum AskForApproval {
/// Under this policy, only “known safe” commands—as determined by
/// `is_safe_command()`—that **only read files** are autoapproved.
/// Everything else will ask the user to approve.
UnlessAllowListed,
/// In addition to everything allowed by **`Suggest`**, commands that
/// *write* to files **within the users approved list of writable paths**
/// are also autoapproved.
/// TODO(ragona): fix
AutoEdit,
/// *All* commands are autoapproved, but they are expected to run inside a
/// sandbox where network access is disabled and writes are confined to a
/// specific set of paths. If the command fails, it will be escalated to
/// the user to approve execution without a sandbox.
OnFailure,
/// Never ask the user to approve commands. Failures are immediately returned
/// to the model, and never escalated to the user for approval.
Never,
}
/// Determines execution restrictions for model shell commands
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub enum SandboxPolicy {
/// Network syscalls will be blocked
NetworkRestricted,
/// Filesystem writes will be restricted
FileWriteRestricted,
/// Network and filesystem writes will be restricted
NetworkAndFileWriteRestricted,
/// No restrictions; full "unsandboxed" mode
DangerousNoRestrictions,
}
impl SandboxPolicy {
pub fn is_dangerous(&self) -> bool {
match self {
SandboxPolicy::NetworkRestricted => false,
SandboxPolicy::FileWriteRestricted => false,
SandboxPolicy::NetworkAndFileWriteRestricted => false,
SandboxPolicy::DangerousNoRestrictions => true,
}
}
pub fn is_network_restricted(&self) -> bool {
matches!(
self,
SandboxPolicy::NetworkRestricted | SandboxPolicy::NetworkAndFileWriteRestricted
)
}
pub fn is_file_write_restricted(&self) -> bool {
matches!(
self,
SandboxPolicy::FileWriteRestricted | SandboxPolicy::NetworkAndFileWriteRestricted
)
}
}
/// User input
#[non_exhaustive]
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize, Serialize)]
#[serde(tag = "type", rename_all = "snake_case")]
pub enum InputItem {
Text {
text: String,
},
/// Preencoded data: URI image.
Image {
image_url: String,
},
/// Local image path provided by the user. This will be converted to an
/// `Image` variant (base64 data URL) during request serialization.
LocalImage {
path: std::path::PathBuf,
},
}
/// Event Queue Entry - events from agent
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize, Serialize)]
pub struct Event {
/// Submission `id` that this event is correlated with.
pub id: String,
/// Payload
pub msg: EventMsg,
}
/// Response event from the agent
#[non_exhaustive]
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize, Serialize)]
#[serde(tag = "type", rename_all = "snake_case")]
pub enum EventMsg {
/// Error while executing a submission
Error {
message: String,
},
/// Agent has started a task
TaskStarted,
/// Agent has completed all actions
TaskComplete,
/// Agent text output message
AgentMessage {
message: String,
},
/// Ack the client's configure message.
SessionConfigured {
/// Tell the client what model is being queried.
model: String,
},
/// Notification that the server is about to execute a command.
ExecCommandBegin {
/// Identifier so this can be paired with the ExecCommandEnd event.
call_id: String,
/// The command to be executed.
command: Vec<String>,
/// The command's working directory if not the default cwd for the
/// agent.
cwd: String,
},
ExecCommandEnd {
/// Identifier for the ExecCommandBegin that finished.
call_id: String,
/// Captured stdout
stdout: String,
/// Captured stderr
stderr: String,
/// The command's exit code.
exit_code: i32,
},
ExecApprovalRequest {
/// The command to be executed.
command: Vec<String>,
/// The command's working directory.
cwd: PathBuf,
/// Optional humanreadable reason for the approval (e.g. retry without
/// sandbox).
#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
reason: Option<String>,
},
ApplyPatchApprovalRequest {
changes: HashMap<PathBuf, FileChange>,
/// Optional explanatory reason (e.g. request for extra write access).
#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
reason: Option<String>,
/// When set, the agent is asking the user to allow writes under this
/// root for the remainder of the session.
#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
grant_root: Option<PathBuf>,
},
BackgroundEvent {
message: String,
},
/// Notification that the agent is about to apply a code patch. Mirrors
/// `ExecCommandBegin` so frontends can show progress indicators.
PatchApplyBegin {
/// Identifier so this can be paired with the PatchApplyEnd event.
call_id: String,
/// If true, there was no ApplyPatchApprovalRequest for this patch.
auto_approved: bool,
/// The changes to be applied.
changes: HashMap<PathBuf, FileChange>,
},
/// Notification that a patch application has finished.
PatchApplyEnd {
/// Identifier for the PatchApplyBegin that finished.
call_id: String,
/// Captured stdout (summary printed by apply_patch).
stdout: String,
/// Captured stderr (parser errors, IO failures, etc.).
stderr: String,
/// Whether the patch was applied successfully.
success: bool,
},
}
/// User's decision in response to an ExecApprovalRequest.
#[derive(Debug, Default, Clone, Copy, Deserialize, Serialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
pub enum ReviewDecision {
/// User has approved this command and the agent should execute it.
Approved,
/// User has approved this command and wants to automatically approve any
/// future identical instances (`command` and `cwd` match exactly) for the
/// remainder of the session.
ApprovedForSession,
/// User has denied this command and the agent should not execute it, but
/// it should continue the session and try something else.
#[default]
Denied,
/// User has denied this command and the agent should not do anything until
/// the user's next command.
Abort,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize, Serialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
pub enum FileChange {
Add {
content: String,
},
Delete,
Update {
unified_diff: String,
move_path: Option<PathBuf>,
},
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize, Serialize)]
pub struct Chunk {
/// 1-based line index of the first line in the original file
pub orig_index: u32,
pub deleted_lines: Vec<String>,
pub inserted_lines: Vec<String>,
}