Files
llmx/codex-rs/core/src/exec.rs
Michael Bolin 40460faf2a fix: tighten up check for /usr/bin/sandbox-exec (#710)
* In both TypeScript and Rust, we now invoke `/usr/bin/sandbox-exec`
explicitly rather than whatever `sandbox-exec` happens to be on the
`PATH`.
* Changed `isSandboxExecAvailable` to use `access()` rather than
`command -v` so that:
  *  We only do the check once over the lifetime of the Codex process.
  * The check is specific to `/usr/bin/sandbox-exec`.
* We now do a syscall rather than incur the overhead of spawning a
process, dealing with timeouts, etc.

I think there is still room for improvement here where we should move
the `isSandboxExecAvailable` check earlier in the CLI, ideally right
after we do arg parsing to verify that we can provide the Seatbelt
sandbox if that is what the user has requested.
2025-04-28 13:42:04 -07:00

347 lines
11 KiB
Rust

use std::io;
#[cfg(target_family = "unix")]
use std::os::unix::process::ExitStatusExt;
use std::path::PathBuf;
use std::process::ExitStatus;
use std::process::Stdio;
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::time::Duration;
use std::time::Instant;
use serde::Deserialize;
use tokio::io::AsyncRead;
use tokio::io::AsyncReadExt;
use tokio::io::BufReader;
use tokio::process::Command;
use tokio::sync::Notify;
use crate::error::CodexErr;
use crate::error::Result;
use crate::error::SandboxErr;
use crate::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
// Maximum we send for each stream, which is either:
// - 10KiB OR
// - 256 lines
const MAX_STREAM_OUTPUT: usize = 10 * 1024;
const MAX_STREAM_OUTPUT_LINES: usize = 256;
const DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS: u64 = 10_000;
// Hardcode these since it does not seem worth including the libc crate just
// for these.
const SIGKILL_CODE: i32 = 9;
const TIMEOUT_CODE: i32 = 64;
const MACOS_SEATBELT_READONLY_POLICY: &str = include_str!("seatbelt_readonly_policy.sbpl");
/// When working with `sandbox-exec`, only consider `sandbox-exec` in `/usr/bin`
/// to defend against an attacker trying to inject a malicious version on the
/// PATH. If /usr/bin/sandbox-exec has been tampered with, then the attacker
/// already has root access.
const MACOS_PATH_TO_SEATBELT_EXECUTABLE: &str = "/usr/bin/sandbox-exec";
#[derive(Deserialize, Debug, Clone)]
pub struct ExecParams {
pub command: Vec<String>,
pub workdir: Option<String>,
/// This is the maximum time in seconds that the command is allowed to run.
#[serde(rename = "timeout")]
// The wire format uses `timeout`, which has ambiguous units, so we use
// `timeout_ms` as the field name so it is clear in code.
pub timeout_ms: Option<u64>,
}
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq)]
pub enum SandboxType {
None,
/// Only available on macOS.
MacosSeatbelt,
/// Only available on Linux.
LinuxSeccomp,
}
#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
async fn exec_linux(
params: ExecParams,
writable_roots: &[PathBuf],
ctrl_c: Arc<Notify>,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy,
) -> Result<RawExecToolCallOutput> {
crate::linux::exec_linux(params, writable_roots, ctrl_c, sandbox_policy).await
}
#[cfg(not(target_os = "linux"))]
async fn exec_linux(
_params: ExecParams,
_writable_roots: &[PathBuf],
_ctrl_c: Arc<Notify>,
_sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy,
) -> Result<RawExecToolCallOutput> {
Err(CodexErr::Io(io::Error::new(
io::ErrorKind::InvalidInput,
"linux sandbox is not supported on this platform",
)))
}
pub async fn process_exec_tool_call(
params: ExecParams,
sandbox_type: SandboxType,
writable_roots: &[PathBuf],
ctrl_c: Arc<Notify>,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy,
) -> Result<ExecToolCallOutput> {
let start = Instant::now();
let raw_output_result = match sandbox_type {
SandboxType::None => exec(params, ctrl_c).await,
SandboxType::MacosSeatbelt => {
let ExecParams {
command,
workdir,
timeout_ms,
} = params;
let seatbelt_command = create_seatbelt_command(command, sandbox_policy, writable_roots);
exec(
ExecParams {
command: seatbelt_command,
workdir,
timeout_ms,
},
ctrl_c,
)
.await
}
SandboxType::LinuxSeccomp => {
exec_linux(params, writable_roots, ctrl_c, sandbox_policy).await
}
};
let duration = start.elapsed();
match raw_output_result {
Ok(raw_output) => {
let stdout = String::from_utf8_lossy(&raw_output.stdout).to_string();
let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&raw_output.stderr).to_string();
#[cfg(target_family = "unix")]
match raw_output.exit_status.signal() {
Some(TIMEOUT_CODE) => return Err(CodexErr::Sandbox(SandboxErr::Timeout)),
Some(signal) => {
return Err(CodexErr::Sandbox(SandboxErr::Signal(signal)));
}
None => {}
}
let exit_code = raw_output.exit_status.code().unwrap_or(-1);
// NOTE(ragona): This is much less restrictive than the previous check. If we exec
// a command, and it returns anything other than success, we assume that it may have
// been a sandboxing error and allow the user to retry. (The user of course may choose
// not to retry, or in a non-interactive mode, would automatically reject the approval.)
if exit_code != 0 && sandbox_type != SandboxType::None {
return Err(CodexErr::Sandbox(SandboxErr::Denied(
exit_code, stdout, stderr,
)));
}
Ok(ExecToolCallOutput {
exit_code,
stdout,
stderr,
duration,
})
}
Err(err) => {
tracing::error!("exec error: {err}");
Err(err)
}
}
}
pub fn create_seatbelt_command(
command: Vec<String>,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy,
writable_roots: &[PathBuf],
) -> Vec<String> {
let (policies, cli_args): (Vec<String>, Vec<String>) = writable_roots
.iter()
.enumerate()
.map(|(index, root)| {
let param_name = format!("WRITABLE_ROOT_{index}");
let policy: String = format!("(subpath (param \"{param_name}\"))");
let cli_arg = format!("-D{param_name}={}", root.to_string_lossy());
(policy, cli_arg)
})
.unzip();
// TODO(ragona): The seatbelt policy should reflect the SandboxPolicy that
// is passed, but everything is currently hardcoded to use
// MACOS_SEATBELT_READONLY_POLICY.
// TODO(mbolin): apply_patch calls must also honor the SandboxPolicy.
if !matches!(sandbox_policy, SandboxPolicy::NetworkRestricted) {
tracing::error!("specified sandbox policy {sandbox_policy:?} will not be honroed");
}
let full_policy = if policies.is_empty() {
MACOS_SEATBELT_READONLY_POLICY.to_string()
} else {
let scoped_write_policy = format!("(allow file-write*\n{}\n)", policies.join(" "));
format!("{MACOS_SEATBELT_READONLY_POLICY}\n{scoped_write_policy}")
};
let mut seatbelt_command: Vec<String> = vec![
MACOS_PATH_TO_SEATBELT_EXECUTABLE.to_string(),
"-p".to_string(),
full_policy.to_string(),
];
seatbelt_command.extend(cli_args);
seatbelt_command.push("--".to_string());
seatbelt_command.extend(command);
seatbelt_command
}
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct RawExecToolCallOutput {
pub exit_status: ExitStatus,
pub stdout: Vec<u8>,
pub stderr: Vec<u8>,
}
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct ExecToolCallOutput {
pub exit_code: i32,
pub stdout: String,
pub stderr: String,
pub duration: Duration,
}
pub async fn exec(
ExecParams {
command,
workdir,
timeout_ms,
}: ExecParams,
ctrl_c: Arc<Notify>,
) -> Result<RawExecToolCallOutput> {
let mut child = {
if command.is_empty() {
return Err(CodexErr::Io(io::Error::new(
io::ErrorKind::InvalidInput,
"command args are empty",
)));
}
let mut cmd = Command::new(&command[0]);
if command.len() > 1 {
cmd.args(&command[1..]);
}
if let Some(dir) = &workdir {
cmd.current_dir(dir);
}
// Do not create a file descriptor for stdin because otherwise some
// commands may hang forever waiting for input. For example, ripgrep has
// a heuristic where it may try to read from stdin as explained here:
// https://github.com/BurntSushi/ripgrep/blob/e2362d4d5185d02fa857bf381e7bd52e66fafc73/crates/core/flags/hiargs.rs#L1101-L1103
cmd.stdin(Stdio::null());
cmd.stdout(Stdio::piped())
.stderr(Stdio::piped())
.kill_on_drop(true)
.spawn()?
};
let stdout_handle = tokio::spawn(read_capped(
BufReader::new(child.stdout.take().expect("stdout is not piped")),
MAX_STREAM_OUTPUT,
MAX_STREAM_OUTPUT_LINES,
));
let stderr_handle = tokio::spawn(read_capped(
BufReader::new(child.stderr.take().expect("stderr is not piped")),
MAX_STREAM_OUTPUT,
MAX_STREAM_OUTPUT_LINES,
));
let interrupted = ctrl_c.notified();
let timeout = Duration::from_millis(timeout_ms.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS));
let exit_status = tokio::select! {
result = tokio::time::timeout(timeout, child.wait()) => {
match result {
Ok(Ok(exit_status)) => exit_status,
Ok(e) => e?,
Err(_) => {
// timeout
child.start_kill()?;
// Debatable whether `child.wait().await` should be called here.
synthetic_exit_status(128 + TIMEOUT_CODE)
}
}
}
_ = interrupted => {
child.start_kill()?;
synthetic_exit_status(128 + SIGKILL_CODE)
}
};
let stdout = stdout_handle.await??;
let stderr = stderr_handle.await??;
Ok(RawExecToolCallOutput {
exit_status,
stdout,
stderr,
})
}
async fn read_capped<R: AsyncRead + Unpin>(
mut reader: R,
max_output: usize,
max_lines: usize,
) -> io::Result<Vec<u8>> {
let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(max_output.min(8 * 1024));
let mut tmp = [0u8; 8192];
let mut remaining_bytes = max_output;
let mut remaining_lines = max_lines;
loop {
let n = reader.read(&mut tmp).await?;
if n == 0 {
break;
}
// Copy into the buffer only while we still have byte and line budget.
if remaining_bytes > 0 && remaining_lines > 0 {
let mut copy_len = 0;
for &b in &tmp[..n] {
if remaining_bytes == 0 || remaining_lines == 0 {
break;
}
copy_len += 1;
remaining_bytes -= 1;
if b == b'\n' {
remaining_lines -= 1;
}
}
buf.extend_from_slice(&tmp[..copy_len]);
}
// Continue reading to EOF to avoid back-pressure, but discard once caps are hit.
}
Ok(buf)
}
#[cfg(unix)]
fn synthetic_exit_status(code: i32) -> ExitStatus {
use std::os::unix::process::ExitStatusExt;
std::process::ExitStatus::from_raw(code)
}
#[cfg(windows)]
fn synthetic_exit_status(code: i32) -> ExitStatus {
use std::os::windows::process::ExitStatusExt;
std::process::ExitStatus::from_raw(code.try_into().unwrap())
}