* In both TypeScript and Rust, we now invoke `/usr/bin/sandbox-exec` explicitly rather than whatever `sandbox-exec` happens to be on the `PATH`. * Changed `isSandboxExecAvailable` to use `access()` rather than `command -v` so that: * We only do the check once over the lifetime of the Codex process. * The check is specific to `/usr/bin/sandbox-exec`. * We now do a syscall rather than incur the overhead of spawning a process, dealing with timeouts, etc. I think there is still room for improvement here where we should move the `isSandboxExecAvailable` check earlier in the CLI, ideally right after we do arg parsing to verify that we can provide the Seatbelt sandbox if that is what the user has requested.
347 lines
11 KiB
Rust
347 lines
11 KiB
Rust
use std::io;
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#[cfg(target_family = "unix")]
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use std::os::unix::process::ExitStatusExt;
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use std::path::PathBuf;
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use std::process::ExitStatus;
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use std::process::Stdio;
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use std::sync::Arc;
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use std::time::Duration;
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use std::time::Instant;
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use serde::Deserialize;
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use tokio::io::AsyncRead;
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use tokio::io::AsyncReadExt;
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use tokio::io::BufReader;
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use tokio::process::Command;
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use tokio::sync::Notify;
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use crate::error::CodexErr;
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use crate::error::Result;
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use crate::error::SandboxErr;
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use crate::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
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// Maximum we send for each stream, which is either:
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// - 10KiB OR
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// - 256 lines
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const MAX_STREAM_OUTPUT: usize = 10 * 1024;
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const MAX_STREAM_OUTPUT_LINES: usize = 256;
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const DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS: u64 = 10_000;
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// Hardcode these since it does not seem worth including the libc crate just
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// for these.
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const SIGKILL_CODE: i32 = 9;
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const TIMEOUT_CODE: i32 = 64;
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const MACOS_SEATBELT_READONLY_POLICY: &str = include_str!("seatbelt_readonly_policy.sbpl");
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/// When working with `sandbox-exec`, only consider `sandbox-exec` in `/usr/bin`
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/// to defend against an attacker trying to inject a malicious version on the
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/// PATH. If /usr/bin/sandbox-exec has been tampered with, then the attacker
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/// already has root access.
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const MACOS_PATH_TO_SEATBELT_EXECUTABLE: &str = "/usr/bin/sandbox-exec";
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#[derive(Deserialize, Debug, Clone)]
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pub struct ExecParams {
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pub command: Vec<String>,
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pub workdir: Option<String>,
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/// This is the maximum time in seconds that the command is allowed to run.
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#[serde(rename = "timeout")]
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// The wire format uses `timeout`, which has ambiguous units, so we use
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// `timeout_ms` as the field name so it is clear in code.
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pub timeout_ms: Option<u64>,
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}
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#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq)]
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pub enum SandboxType {
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None,
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/// Only available on macOS.
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MacosSeatbelt,
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/// Only available on Linux.
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LinuxSeccomp,
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}
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#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
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async fn exec_linux(
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params: ExecParams,
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writable_roots: &[PathBuf],
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ctrl_c: Arc<Notify>,
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sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy,
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) -> Result<RawExecToolCallOutput> {
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crate::linux::exec_linux(params, writable_roots, ctrl_c, sandbox_policy).await
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}
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#[cfg(not(target_os = "linux"))]
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async fn exec_linux(
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_params: ExecParams,
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_writable_roots: &[PathBuf],
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_ctrl_c: Arc<Notify>,
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_sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy,
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) -> Result<RawExecToolCallOutput> {
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Err(CodexErr::Io(io::Error::new(
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io::ErrorKind::InvalidInput,
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"linux sandbox is not supported on this platform",
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)))
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}
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pub async fn process_exec_tool_call(
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params: ExecParams,
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sandbox_type: SandboxType,
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writable_roots: &[PathBuf],
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ctrl_c: Arc<Notify>,
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sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy,
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) -> Result<ExecToolCallOutput> {
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let start = Instant::now();
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let raw_output_result = match sandbox_type {
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SandboxType::None => exec(params, ctrl_c).await,
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SandboxType::MacosSeatbelt => {
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let ExecParams {
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command,
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workdir,
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timeout_ms,
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} = params;
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let seatbelt_command = create_seatbelt_command(command, sandbox_policy, writable_roots);
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exec(
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ExecParams {
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command: seatbelt_command,
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workdir,
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timeout_ms,
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},
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ctrl_c,
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)
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.await
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}
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SandboxType::LinuxSeccomp => {
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exec_linux(params, writable_roots, ctrl_c, sandbox_policy).await
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}
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};
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let duration = start.elapsed();
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match raw_output_result {
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Ok(raw_output) => {
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let stdout = String::from_utf8_lossy(&raw_output.stdout).to_string();
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let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&raw_output.stderr).to_string();
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#[cfg(target_family = "unix")]
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match raw_output.exit_status.signal() {
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Some(TIMEOUT_CODE) => return Err(CodexErr::Sandbox(SandboxErr::Timeout)),
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Some(signal) => {
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return Err(CodexErr::Sandbox(SandboxErr::Signal(signal)));
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}
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None => {}
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}
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let exit_code = raw_output.exit_status.code().unwrap_or(-1);
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// NOTE(ragona): This is much less restrictive than the previous check. If we exec
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// a command, and it returns anything other than success, we assume that it may have
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// been a sandboxing error and allow the user to retry. (The user of course may choose
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// not to retry, or in a non-interactive mode, would automatically reject the approval.)
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if exit_code != 0 && sandbox_type != SandboxType::None {
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return Err(CodexErr::Sandbox(SandboxErr::Denied(
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exit_code, stdout, stderr,
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)));
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}
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Ok(ExecToolCallOutput {
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exit_code,
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stdout,
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stderr,
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duration,
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})
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}
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Err(err) => {
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tracing::error!("exec error: {err}");
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Err(err)
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}
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}
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}
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pub fn create_seatbelt_command(
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command: Vec<String>,
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sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy,
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writable_roots: &[PathBuf],
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) -> Vec<String> {
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let (policies, cli_args): (Vec<String>, Vec<String>) = writable_roots
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.iter()
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.enumerate()
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.map(|(index, root)| {
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let param_name = format!("WRITABLE_ROOT_{index}");
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let policy: String = format!("(subpath (param \"{param_name}\"))");
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let cli_arg = format!("-D{param_name}={}", root.to_string_lossy());
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(policy, cli_arg)
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})
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.unzip();
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// TODO(ragona): The seatbelt policy should reflect the SandboxPolicy that
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// is passed, but everything is currently hardcoded to use
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// MACOS_SEATBELT_READONLY_POLICY.
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// TODO(mbolin): apply_patch calls must also honor the SandboxPolicy.
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if !matches!(sandbox_policy, SandboxPolicy::NetworkRestricted) {
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tracing::error!("specified sandbox policy {sandbox_policy:?} will not be honroed");
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}
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let full_policy = if policies.is_empty() {
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MACOS_SEATBELT_READONLY_POLICY.to_string()
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} else {
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let scoped_write_policy = format!("(allow file-write*\n{}\n)", policies.join(" "));
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format!("{MACOS_SEATBELT_READONLY_POLICY}\n{scoped_write_policy}")
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};
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let mut seatbelt_command: Vec<String> = vec![
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MACOS_PATH_TO_SEATBELT_EXECUTABLE.to_string(),
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"-p".to_string(),
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full_policy.to_string(),
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];
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seatbelt_command.extend(cli_args);
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seatbelt_command.push("--".to_string());
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seatbelt_command.extend(command);
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seatbelt_command
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}
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#[derive(Debug)]
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pub struct RawExecToolCallOutput {
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pub exit_status: ExitStatus,
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pub stdout: Vec<u8>,
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pub stderr: Vec<u8>,
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}
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#[derive(Debug)]
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pub struct ExecToolCallOutput {
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pub exit_code: i32,
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pub stdout: String,
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pub stderr: String,
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pub duration: Duration,
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}
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pub async fn exec(
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ExecParams {
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command,
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workdir,
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timeout_ms,
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}: ExecParams,
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ctrl_c: Arc<Notify>,
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) -> Result<RawExecToolCallOutput> {
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let mut child = {
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if command.is_empty() {
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return Err(CodexErr::Io(io::Error::new(
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io::ErrorKind::InvalidInput,
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"command args are empty",
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)));
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}
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let mut cmd = Command::new(&command[0]);
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if command.len() > 1 {
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cmd.args(&command[1..]);
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}
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if let Some(dir) = &workdir {
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cmd.current_dir(dir);
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}
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// Do not create a file descriptor for stdin because otherwise some
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// commands may hang forever waiting for input. For example, ripgrep has
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// a heuristic where it may try to read from stdin as explained here:
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// https://github.com/BurntSushi/ripgrep/blob/e2362d4d5185d02fa857bf381e7bd52e66fafc73/crates/core/flags/hiargs.rs#L1101-L1103
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cmd.stdin(Stdio::null());
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cmd.stdout(Stdio::piped())
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.stderr(Stdio::piped())
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.kill_on_drop(true)
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.spawn()?
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};
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let stdout_handle = tokio::spawn(read_capped(
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BufReader::new(child.stdout.take().expect("stdout is not piped")),
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MAX_STREAM_OUTPUT,
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MAX_STREAM_OUTPUT_LINES,
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));
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let stderr_handle = tokio::spawn(read_capped(
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BufReader::new(child.stderr.take().expect("stderr is not piped")),
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MAX_STREAM_OUTPUT,
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MAX_STREAM_OUTPUT_LINES,
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));
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let interrupted = ctrl_c.notified();
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let timeout = Duration::from_millis(timeout_ms.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS));
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let exit_status = tokio::select! {
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result = tokio::time::timeout(timeout, child.wait()) => {
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match result {
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Ok(Ok(exit_status)) => exit_status,
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Ok(e) => e?,
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Err(_) => {
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// timeout
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child.start_kill()?;
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// Debatable whether `child.wait().await` should be called here.
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synthetic_exit_status(128 + TIMEOUT_CODE)
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}
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}
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}
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_ = interrupted => {
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child.start_kill()?;
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synthetic_exit_status(128 + SIGKILL_CODE)
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}
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};
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let stdout = stdout_handle.await??;
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let stderr = stderr_handle.await??;
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Ok(RawExecToolCallOutput {
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exit_status,
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stdout,
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stderr,
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})
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}
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async fn read_capped<R: AsyncRead + Unpin>(
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mut reader: R,
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max_output: usize,
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max_lines: usize,
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) -> io::Result<Vec<u8>> {
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let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(max_output.min(8 * 1024));
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let mut tmp = [0u8; 8192];
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let mut remaining_bytes = max_output;
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let mut remaining_lines = max_lines;
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loop {
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let n = reader.read(&mut tmp).await?;
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if n == 0 {
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break;
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}
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// Copy into the buffer only while we still have byte and line budget.
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if remaining_bytes > 0 && remaining_lines > 0 {
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let mut copy_len = 0;
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for &b in &tmp[..n] {
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if remaining_bytes == 0 || remaining_lines == 0 {
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break;
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}
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copy_len += 1;
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remaining_bytes -= 1;
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if b == b'\n' {
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remaining_lines -= 1;
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}
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}
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buf.extend_from_slice(&tmp[..copy_len]);
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}
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// Continue reading to EOF to avoid back-pressure, but discard once caps are hit.
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}
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Ok(buf)
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}
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#[cfg(unix)]
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fn synthetic_exit_status(code: i32) -> ExitStatus {
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use std::os::unix::process::ExitStatusExt;
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std::process::ExitStatus::from_raw(code)
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}
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#[cfg(windows)]
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fn synthetic_exit_status(code: i32) -> ExitStatus {
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use std::os::windows::process::ExitStatusExt;
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std::process::ExitStatus::from_raw(code.try_into().unwrap())
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}
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