Commit Graph

8 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Michael Bolin
8595237505 fix: ensure cwd for conversation and sandbox are separate concerns (#3874)
Previous to this PR, both of these functions take a single `cwd`:


71038381aa/codex-rs/core/src/seatbelt.rs (L19-L25)


71038381aa/codex-rs/core/src/landlock.rs (L16-L23)

whereas `cwd` and `sandbox_cwd` should be set independently (fixed in
this PR).

Added `sandbox_distinguishes_command_and_policy_cwds()` to
`codex-rs/exec/tests/suite/sandbox.rs` to verify this.
2025-09-18 14:37:06 -07:00
Michael Bolin
2ecca79663 fix: run python_multiprocessing_lock_works integration test on Mac and Linux (#2318)
The high-order bit on this PR is that it makes it so `sandbox.rs` tests
both Mac and Linux, as we introduce a general
`spawn_command_under_sandbox()` function with platform-specific
implementations for testing.

An important, and interesting, discovery in porting the test to Linux is
that (for reasons cited in the code comments), `/dev/shm` has to be
added to `writable_roots` on Linux in order for `multiprocessing.Lock`
to work there. Granting write access to `/dev/shm` comes with some
degree of risk, so we do not make this the default for Codex CLI.

Piggybacking on top of #2317, this moves the
`python_multiprocessing_lock_works` test yet again, moving
`codex-rs/core/tests/sandbox.rs` to `codex-rs/exec/tests/sandbox.rs`
because in `codex-rs/exec/tests` we can use `cargo_bin()` like so:

```
let codex_linux_sandbox_exe = assert_cmd::cargo::cargo_bin("codex-exec");
```

which is necessary so we can use `codex_linux_sandbox_exe` and therefore
`spawn_command_under_linux_sandbox` in an integration test.

This also moves `spawn_command_under_linux_sandbox()` out of `exec.rs`
and into `landlock.rs`, which makes things more consistent with
`seatbelt.rs` in `codex-core`.

For reference, https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/1808 is the PR that
made the change to Seatbelt to get this test to pass on Mac.
2025-08-14 15:47:48 -07:00
Michael Bolin
89ef4efdcf fix: overhaul how we spawn commands under seccomp/landlock on Linux (#1086)
Historically, we spawned the Seatbelt and Landlock sandboxes in
substantially different ways:

For **Seatbelt**, we would run `/usr/bin/sandbox-exec` with our policy
specified as an arg followed by the original command:


d1de7bb383/codex-rs/core/src/exec.rs (L147-L219)

For **Landlock/Seccomp**, we would do
`tokio::runtime::Builder::new_current_thread()`, _invoke
Landlock/Seccomp APIs to modify the permissions of that new thread_, and
then spawn the command:


d1de7bb383/codex-rs/core/src/exec_linux.rs (L28-L49)

While it is neat that Landlock/Seccomp supports applying a policy to
only one thread without having to apply it to the entire process, it
requires us to maintain two different codepaths and is a bit harder to
reason about. The tipping point was
https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/1061, in which we had to start
building up the `env` in an unexpected way for the existing
Landlock/Seccomp approach to continue to work.

This PR overhauls things so that we do similar things for Mac and Linux.
It turned out that we were already building our own "helper binary"
comparable to Mac's `sandbox-exec` as part of the `cli` crate:


d1de7bb383/codex-rs/cli/Cargo.toml (L10-L12)

We originally created this to build a small binary to include with the
Node.js version of the Codex CLI to provide support for Linux
sandboxing.

Though the sticky bit is that, at this point, we still want to deploy
the Rust version of Codex as a single, standalone binary rather than a
CLI and a supporting sandboxing binary. To satisfy this goal, we use
"the arg0 trick," in which we:

* use `std::env::current_exe()` to get the path to the CLI that is
currently running
* use the CLI as the `program` for the `Command`
* set `"codex-linux-sandbox"` as arg0 for the `Command`

A CLI that supports sandboxing should check arg0 at the start of the
program. If it is `"codex-linux-sandbox"`, it must invoke
`codex_linux_sandbox::run_main()`, which runs the CLI as if it were
`codex-linux-sandbox`. When acting as `codex-linux-sandbox`, we make the
appropriate Landlock/Seccomp API calls and then use `execvp(3)` to spawn
the original command, so do _replace_ the process rather than spawn a
subprocess. Incidentally, we do this before starting the Tokio runtime,
so the process should only have one thread when `execvp(3)` is called.

Because the `core` crate that needs to spawn the Linux sandboxing is not
a CLI in its own right, this means that every CLI that includes `core`
and relies on this behavior has to (1) implement it and (2) provide the
path to the sandboxing executable. While the path is almost always
`std::env::current_exe()`, we needed to make this configurable for
integration tests, so `Config` now has a `codex_linux_sandbox_exe:
Option<PathBuf>` property to facilitate threading this through,
introduced in https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/1089.

This common pattern is now captured in
`codex_linux_sandbox::run_with_sandbox()` and all of the `main.rs`
functions that should use it have been updated as part of this PR.

The `codex-linux-sandbox` crate added to the Cargo workspace as part of
this PR now has the bulk of the Landlock/Seccomp logic, which makes
`core` a bit simpler. Indeed, `core/src/exec_linux.rs` and
`core/src/landlock.rs` were removed/ported as part of this PR. I also
moved the unit tests for this code into an integration test,
`linux-sandbox/tests/landlock.rs`, in which I use
`env!("CARGO_BIN_EXE_codex-linux-sandbox")` as the value for
`codex_linux_sandbox_exe` since `std::env::current_exe()` is not
appropriate in that case.
2025-05-23 11:37:07 -07:00
Michael Bolin
cb379d7797 feat: introduce support for shell_environment_policy in config.toml (#1061)
To date, when handling `shell` and `local_shell` tool calls, we were
spawning new processes using the environment inherited from the Codex
process itself. This means that the sensitive `OPENAI_API_KEY` that
Codex needs to talk to OpenAI models was made available to everything
run by `shell` and `local_shell`. While there are cases where that might
be useful, it does not seem like a good default.

This PR introduces a complex `shell_environment_policy` config option to
control the `env` used with these tool calls. It is inevitably a bit
complex so that it is possible to override individual components of the
policy so without having to restate the entire thing.

Details are in the updated `README.md` in this PR, but here is the
relevant bit that explains the individual fields of
`shell_environment_policy`:

| Field | Type | Default | Description |
| ------------------------- | -------------------------- | ------- |
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
| `inherit` | string | `core` | Starting template for the
environment:<br>`core` (`HOME`, `PATH`, `USER`, …), `all` (clone full
parent env), or `none` (start empty). |
| `ignore_default_excludes` | boolean | `false` | When `false`, Codex
removes any var whose **name** contains `KEY`, `SECRET`, or `TOKEN`
(case-insensitive) before other rules run. |
| `exclude` | array&lt;string&gt; | `[]` | Case-insensitive glob
patterns to drop after the default filter.<br>Examples: `"AWS_*"`,
`"AZURE_*"`. |
| `set` | table&lt;string,string&gt; | `{}` | Explicit key/value
overrides or additions – always win over inherited values. |
| `include_only` | array&lt;string&gt; | `[]` | If non-empty, a
whitelist of patterns; only variables that match _one_ pattern survive
the final step. (Generally used with `inherit = "all"`.) |


In particular, note that the default is `inherit = "core"`, so:

* if you have extra env variables that you want to inherit from the
parent process, use `inherit = "all"` and then specify `include_only`
* if you have extra env variables where you want to hardcode the values,
the default `inherit = "core"` will work fine, but then you need to
specify `set`

This configuration is not battle-tested, so we will probably still have
to play with it a bit. `core/src/exec_env.rs` has the critical business
logic as well as unit tests.

Though if nothing else, previous to this change:

```
$ cargo run --bin codex -- debug seatbelt -- printenv OPENAI_API_KEY
# ...prints OPENAI_API_KEY...
```

But after this change it does not print anything (as desired).

One final thing to call out about this PR is that the
`configure_command!` macro we use in `core/src/exec.rs` has to do some
complex logic with respect to how it builds up the `env` for the process
being spawned under Landlock/seccomp. Specifically, doing
`cmd.env_clear()` followed by `cmd.envs(&$env_map)` (which is arguably
the most intuitive way to do it) caused the Landlock unit tests to fail
because the processes spawned by the unit tests started failing in
unexpected ways! If we forgo `env_clear()` in favor of updating env vars
one at a time, the tests still pass. The comment in the code talks about
this a bit, and while I would like to investigate this more, I need to
move on for the moment, but I do plan to come back to it to fully
understand what is going on. For example, this suggests that we might
not be able to spawn a C program that calls `env_clear()`, which would
be...weird. We may still have to fiddle with our Landlock config if that
is the case.
2025-05-22 09:51:19 -07:00
Michael Bolin
399e819c9b fix: increase timeout for test_dev_null_write (#933)
After updating this test in https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/923, I
have been getting some timeouts with this test in CI, so increasing the
timeout to match that of `test_writable_root`:


327cf41f0f/codex-rs/core/src/landlock.rs (L211-L213)
2025-05-14 10:06:14 -07:00
Michael Bolin
5bf9445351 fix: test_dev_null_write() was not using echo as intended (#923)
I believe this test meant to verify that echoing content to `/dev/null`
succeeded, but instead, I believe it was testing the equivalent to `echo
'blah > /dev/null'`.
2025-05-13 21:40:26 -07:00
jcoens-openai
f3bd143867 Disallow expect via lints (#865)
Adds `expect()` as a denied lint. Same deal applies with `unwrap()`
where we now need to put `#[expect(...` on ones that we legit want. Took
care to enable `expect()` in test contexts.

# Tests

```
cargo fmt
cargo clippy --all-features --all-targets --no-deps -- -D warnings
cargo test
```
2025-05-12 08:45:46 -07:00
Michael Bolin
fde48aaa0d feat: experimental env var: CODEX_SANDBOX_NETWORK_DISABLED (#879)
When using Codex to develop Codex itself, I noticed that sometimes it
would try to add `#[ignore]` to the following tests:

```
keeps_previous_response_id_between_tasks()
retries_on_early_close()
```

Both of these tests start a `MockServer` that launches an HTTP server on
an ephemeral port and requires network access to hit it, which the
Seatbelt policy associated with `--full-auto` correctly denies. If I
wasn't paying attention to the code that Codex was generating, one of
these `#[ignore]` annotations could have slipped into the codebase,
effectively disabling the test for everyone.

To that end, this PR enables an experimental environment variable named
`CODEX_SANDBOX_NETWORK_DISABLED` that is set to `1` if the
`SandboxPolicy` used to spawn the process does not have full network
access. I say it is "experimental" because I'm not convinced this API is
quite right, but we need to start somewhere. (It might be more
appropriate to have an env var like `CODEX_SANDBOX=full-auto`, but the
challenge is that our newer `SandboxPolicy` abstraction does not map to
a simple set of enums like in the TypeScript CLI.)

We leverage this new functionality by adding the following code to the
aforementioned tests as a way to "dynamically disable" them:

```rust
if std::env::var(CODEX_SANDBOX_NETWORK_DISABLED_ENV_VAR).is_ok() {
    println!(
        "Skipping test because it cannot execute when network is disabled in a Codex sandbox."
    );
    return;
}
```

We can use the `debug seatbelt --full-auto` command to verify that
`cargo test` fails when run under Seatbelt prior to this change:

```
$ cargo run --bin codex -- debug seatbelt --full-auto -- cargo test
---- keeps_previous_response_id_between_tasks stdout ----

thread 'keeps_previous_response_id_between_tasks' panicked at /Users/mbolin/.cargo/registry/src/index.crates.io-1949cf8c6b5b557f/wiremock-0.6.3/src/mock_server/builder.rs:107:46:
Failed to bind an OS port for a mock server.: Os { code: 1, kind: PermissionDenied, message: "Operation not permitted" }
note: run with `RUST_BACKTRACE=1` environment variable to display a backtrace


failures:
    keeps_previous_response_id_between_tasks

test result: FAILED. 0 passed; 1 failed; 0 ignored; 0 measured; 0 filtered out; finished in 0.00s

error: test failed, to rerun pass `-p codex-core --test previous_response_id`
```

Though after this change, the above command succeeds! This means that,
going forward, when Codex operates on Codex itself, when it runs `cargo
test`, only "real failures" should cause the command to fail.

As part of this change, I decided to tighten up the codepaths for
running `exec()` for shell tool calls. In particular, we do it in `core`
for the main Codex business logic itself, but we also expose this logic
via `debug` subcommands in the CLI in the `cli` crate. The logic for the
`debug` subcommands was not quite as faithful to the true business logic
as I liked, so I:

* refactored a bit of the Linux code, splitting `linux.rs` into
`linux_exec.rs` and `landlock.rs` in the `core` crate.
* gating less code behind `#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]` because such
code does not get built by default when I develop on Mac, which means I
either have to build the code in Docker or wait for CI signal
* introduced `macro_rules! configure_command` in `exec.rs` so we can
have both sync and async versions of this code. The synchronous version
seems more appropriate for straight threads or potentially fork/exec.
2025-05-09 18:29:34 -07:00