feat: make .git read-only within a writable root when using Seatbelt (#1765)

To make `--full-auto` safer, this PR updates the Seatbelt policy so that
a `SandboxPolicy` with a `writable_root` that contains a `.git/`
_directory_ will make `.git/` _read-only_ (though as a follow-up, we
should also consider the case where `.git` is a _file_ with a `gitdir:
/path/to/actual/repo/.git` entry that should also be protected).

The two major changes in this PR:

- Updating `SandboxPolicy::get_writable_roots_with_cwd()` to return a
`Vec<WritableRoot>` instead of a `Vec<PathBuf>` where a `WritableRoot`
can specify a list of read-only subpaths.
- Updating `create_seatbelt_command_args()` to honor the read-only
subpaths in `WritableRoot`.

The logic to update the policy is a fairly straightforward update to
`create_seatbelt_command_args()`, but perhaps the more interesting part
of this PR is the introduction of an integration test in
`tests/sandbox.rs`. Leveraging the new API in #1785, we test
`SandboxPolicy` under various conditions, including ones where `$TMPDIR`
is not readable, which is critical for verifying the new behavior.

To ensure that Codex can run its own tests, e.g.:

```
just codex debug seatbelt --full-auto -- cargo test if_git_repo_is_writable_root_then_dot_git_folder_is_read_only
```

I had to introduce the use of `CODEX_SANDBOX=sandbox`, which is
comparable to how `CODEX_SANDBOX_NETWORK_DISABLED=1` was already being
used.

Adding a comparable change for Landlock will be done in a subsequent PR.

codex-rs/core/tests/sandbox.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
+#![cfg(target_os = "macos")]
+#![expect(clippy::expect_used)]
+
+use std::collections::HashMap;
+use std::path::Path;
+use std::path::PathBuf;
+
+use codex_core::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
+use codex_core::seatbelt::spawn_command_under_seatbelt;
+use codex_core::spawn::CODEX_SANDBOX_ENV_VAR;
+use codex_core::spawn::StdioPolicy;
+use tempfile::TempDir;
+
+struct TestScenario {
+    repo_parent: PathBuf,
+    file_outside_repo: PathBuf,
+    repo_root: PathBuf,
+    file_in_repo_root: PathBuf,
+    file_in_dot_git_dir: PathBuf,
+}
+
+struct TestExpectations {
+    file_outside_repo_is_writable: bool,
+    file_in_repo_root_is_writable: bool,
+    file_in_dot_git_dir_is_writable: bool,
+}
+
+impl TestScenario {
+    async fn run_test(&self, policy: &SandboxPolicy, expectations: TestExpectations) {
+        if std::env::var(CODEX_SANDBOX_ENV_VAR) == Ok("seatbelt".to_string()) {
+            eprintln!("{CODEX_SANDBOX_ENV_VAR} is set to 'seatbelt', skipping test.");
+            return;
+        }
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            touch(&self.file_outside_repo, policy).await,
+            expectations.file_outside_repo_is_writable
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            self.file_outside_repo.exists(),
+            expectations.file_outside_repo_is_writable
+        );
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            touch(&self.file_in_repo_root, policy).await,
+            expectations.file_in_repo_root_is_writable
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            self.file_in_repo_root.exists(),
+            expectations.file_in_repo_root_is_writable
+        );
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            touch(&self.file_in_dot_git_dir, policy).await,
+            expectations.file_in_dot_git_dir_is_writable
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            self.file_in_dot_git_dir.exists(),
+            expectations.file_in_dot_git_dir_is_writable
+        );
+    }
+}
+
+/// If the user has added a workspace root that is not a Git repo root, then
+/// the user has to specify `--skip-git-repo-check` or go through some
+/// interstitial that indicates they are taking on some risk because Git
+/// cannot be used to backup their work before the agent begins.
+///
+/// Because the user has agreed to this risk, we do not try find all .git
+/// folders in the workspace and block them (though we could change our
+/// position on this in the future).
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn if_parent_of_repo_is_writable_then_dot_git_folder_is_writable() {
+    let tmp = TempDir::new().expect("should be able to create temp dir");
+    let test_scenario = create_test_scenario(&tmp);
+    let policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
+        writable_roots: vec![test_scenario.repo_parent.clone()],
+        network_access: false,
+        include_default_writable_roots: false,
+    };
+
+    test_scenario
+        .run_test(
+            &policy,
+            TestExpectations {
+                file_outside_repo_is_writable: true,
+                file_in_repo_root_is_writable: true,
+                file_in_dot_git_dir_is_writable: true,
+            },
+        )
+        .await;
+}
+
+/// When the writable root is the root of a Git repository (as evidenced by the
+/// presence of a .git folder), then the .git folder should be read-only if
+/// the policy is `WorkspaceWrite`.
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn if_git_repo_is_writable_root_then_dot_git_folder_is_read_only() {
+    let tmp = TempDir::new().expect("should be able to create temp dir");
+    let test_scenario = create_test_scenario(&tmp);
+    let policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
+        writable_roots: vec![test_scenario.repo_root.clone()],
+        network_access: false,
+        include_default_writable_roots: false,
+    };
+
+    test_scenario
+        .run_test(
+            &policy,
+            TestExpectations {
+                file_outside_repo_is_writable: false,
+                file_in_repo_root_is_writable: true,
+                file_in_dot_git_dir_is_writable: false,
+            },
+        )
+        .await;
+}
+
+/// Under DangerFullAccess, all writes should be permitted anywhere on disk,
+/// including inside the .git folder.
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn danger_full_access_allows_all_writes() {
+    let tmp = TempDir::new().expect("should be able to create temp dir");
+    let test_scenario = create_test_scenario(&tmp);
+    let policy = SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess;
+
+    test_scenario
+        .run_test(
+            &policy,
+            TestExpectations {
+                file_outside_repo_is_writable: true,
+                file_in_repo_root_is_writable: true,
+                file_in_dot_git_dir_is_writable: true,
+            },
+        )
+        .await;
+}
+
+/// Under ReadOnly, writes should not be permitted anywhere on disk.
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn read_only_forbids_all_writes() {
+    let tmp = TempDir::new().expect("should be able to create temp dir");
+    let test_scenario = create_test_scenario(&tmp);
+    let policy = SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly;
+
+    test_scenario
+        .run_test(
+            &policy,
+            TestExpectations {
+                file_outside_repo_is_writable: false,
+                file_in_repo_root_is_writable: false,
+                file_in_dot_git_dir_is_writable: false,
+            },
+        )
+        .await;
+}
+
+fn create_test_scenario(tmp: &TempDir) -> TestScenario {
+    let repo_parent = tmp.path().to_path_buf();
+    let repo_root = repo_parent.join("repo");
+    let dot_git_dir = repo_root.join(".git");
+
+    std::fs::create_dir(&repo_root).expect("should be able to create repo root");
+    std::fs::create_dir(&dot_git_dir).expect("should be able to create .git dir");
+
+    TestScenario {
+        file_outside_repo: repo_parent.join("outside.txt"),
+        repo_parent,
+        file_in_repo_root: repo_root.join("repo_file.txt"),
+        repo_root,
+        file_in_dot_git_dir: dot_git_dir.join("dot_git_file.txt"),
+    }
+}
+
+/// Note that `path` must be absolute.
+async fn touch(path: &Path, policy: &SandboxPolicy) -> bool {
+    assert!(path.is_absolute(), "Path must be absolute: {path:?}");
+    let mut child = spawn_command_under_seatbelt(
+        vec![
+            "/usr/bin/touch".to_string(),
+            path.to_string_lossy().to_string(),
+        ],
+        policy,
+        std::env::current_dir().expect("should be able to get current dir"),
+        StdioPolicy::RedirectForShellTool,
+        HashMap::new(),
+    )
+    .await
+    .expect("should be able to spawn command under seatbelt");
+    child
+        .wait()
+        .await
+        .expect("should be able to wait for child process")
+        .success()
+}