feat: load defaults into Config and introduce ConfigOverrides (#677)
This changes how instantiating `Config` works and also adds `approval_policy` and `sandbox_policy` as fields. The idea is: * All fields of `Config` have appropriate default values. * `Config` is initially loaded from `~/.codex/config.toml`, so values in `config.toml` will override those defaults. * Clients must instantiate `Config` via `Config::load_with_overrides(ConfigOverrides)` where `ConfigOverrides` has optional overrides that are expected to be settable based on CLI flags. The `Config` should be defined early in the program and then passed down. Now functions like `init_codex()` take fewer individual parameters because they can just take a `Config`. Also, `Config::load()` used to fail silently if `~/.codex/config.toml` had a parse error and fell back to the default config. This seemed really bad because it wasn't clear why the values in my `config.toml` weren't getting picked up. I changed things so that `load_with_overrides()` returns `Result<Config>` and verified that the various CLIs print a reasonable error if `config.toml` is malformed. Finally, I also updated the TUI to show which **sandbox** value is being used, as we do for other key values like **model** and **approval**. This was also a reminder that the various values of `--sandbox` are honored on Linux but not macOS today, so I added some TODOs about fixing that.
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@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ pub enum Op {
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/// Configure the model session.
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ConfigureSession {
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/// If not specified, server will use its default model.
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model: Option<String>,
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model: String,
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/// Model instructions
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instructions: Option<String>,
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/// When to escalate for approval for execution
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@@ -66,11 +66,13 @@ pub enum Op {
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}
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/// Determines how liberally commands are auto‑approved by the system.
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, Default, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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#[serde(rename_all = "kebab-case")]
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pub enum AskForApproval {
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/// Under this policy, only “known safe” commands—as determined by
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/// `is_safe_command()`—that **only read files** are auto‑approved.
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/// Everything else will ask the user to approve.
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#[default]
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UnlessAllowListed,
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/// In addition to everything allowed by **`Suggest`**, commands that
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@@ -91,13 +93,15 @@ pub enum AskForApproval {
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}
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/// Determines execution restrictions for model shell commands
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, Default, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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#[serde(rename_all = "kebab-case")]
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pub enum SandboxPolicy {
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/// Network syscalls will be blocked
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NetworkRestricted,
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/// Filesystem writes will be restricted
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FileWriteRestricted,
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/// Network and filesystem writes will be restricted
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#[default]
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NetworkAndFileWriteRestricted,
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/// No restrictions; full "unsandboxed" mode
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DangerousNoRestrictions,
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