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llmx/codex-rs/core/tests/suite/seatbelt.rs

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#![cfg(target_os = "macos")]
//! Tests for the macOS sandboxing that are specific to Seatbelt.
//! Tests that apply to both Mac and Linux sandboxing should go in sandbox.rs.
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::path::Path;
use std::path::PathBuf;
use codex_core::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
use codex_core::seatbelt::spawn_command_under_seatbelt;
use codex_core::spawn::CODEX_SANDBOX_ENV_VAR;
use codex_core::spawn::StdioPolicy;
use tempfile::TempDir;
struct TestScenario {
repo_parent: PathBuf,
file_outside_repo: PathBuf,
repo_root: PathBuf,
file_in_repo_root: PathBuf,
file_in_dot_git_dir: PathBuf,
}
struct TestExpectations {
file_outside_repo_is_writable: bool,
file_in_repo_root_is_writable: bool,
file_in_dot_git_dir_is_writable: bool,
}
impl TestScenario {
async fn run_test(&self, policy: &SandboxPolicy, expectations: TestExpectations) {
if std::env::var(CODEX_SANDBOX_ENV_VAR) == Ok("seatbelt".to_string()) {
eprintln!("{CODEX_SANDBOX_ENV_VAR} is set to 'seatbelt', skipping test.");
return;
}
assert_eq!(
touch(&self.file_outside_repo, policy).await,
expectations.file_outside_repo_is_writable
);
assert_eq!(
self.file_outside_repo.exists(),
expectations.file_outside_repo_is_writable
);
assert_eq!(
touch(&self.file_in_repo_root, policy).await,
expectations.file_in_repo_root_is_writable
);
assert_eq!(
self.file_in_repo_root.exists(),
expectations.file_in_repo_root_is_writable
);
assert_eq!(
touch(&self.file_in_dot_git_dir, policy).await,
expectations.file_in_dot_git_dir_is_writable
);
assert_eq!(
self.file_in_dot_git_dir.exists(),
expectations.file_in_dot_git_dir_is_writable
);
}
}
/// If the user has added a workspace root that is not a Git repo root, then
/// the user has to specify `--skip-git-repo-check` or go through some
/// interstitial that indicates they are taking on some risk because Git
/// cannot be used to backup their work before the agent begins.
///
/// Because the user has agreed to this risk, we do not try find all .git
/// folders in the workspace and block them (though we could change our
/// position on this in the future).
#[tokio::test]
async fn if_parent_of_repo_is_writable_then_dot_git_folder_is_writable() {
let tmp = TempDir::new().expect("should be able to create temp dir");
let test_scenario = create_test_scenario(&tmp);
let policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: vec![test_scenario.repo_parent.clone()],
network_access: false,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
exclude_slash_tmp: true,
};
test_scenario
.run_test(
&policy,
TestExpectations {
file_outside_repo_is_writable: true,
file_in_repo_root_is_writable: true,
file_in_dot_git_dir_is_writable: true,
},
)
.await;
}
/// When the writable root is the root of a Git repository (as evidenced by the
/// presence of a .git folder), then the .git folder should be read-only if
/// the policy is `WorkspaceWrite`.
#[tokio::test]
async fn if_git_repo_is_writable_root_then_dot_git_folder_is_read_only() {
let tmp = TempDir::new().expect("should be able to create temp dir");
let test_scenario = create_test_scenario(&tmp);
let policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: vec![test_scenario.repo_root.clone()],
network_access: false,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
exclude_slash_tmp: true,
};
test_scenario
.run_test(
&policy,
TestExpectations {
file_outside_repo_is_writable: false,
file_in_repo_root_is_writable: true,
file_in_dot_git_dir_is_writable: false,
},
)
.await;
}
/// Under DangerFullAccess, all writes should be permitted anywhere on disk,
/// including inside the .git folder.
#[tokio::test]
async fn danger_full_access_allows_all_writes() {
let tmp = TempDir::new().expect("should be able to create temp dir");
let test_scenario = create_test_scenario(&tmp);
let policy = SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess;
test_scenario
.run_test(
&policy,
TestExpectations {
file_outside_repo_is_writable: true,
file_in_repo_root_is_writable: true,
file_in_dot_git_dir_is_writable: true,
},
)
.await;
}
/// Under ReadOnly, writes should not be permitted anywhere on disk.
#[tokio::test]
async fn read_only_forbids_all_writes() {
let tmp = TempDir::new().expect("should be able to create temp dir");
let test_scenario = create_test_scenario(&tmp);
let policy = SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly;
test_scenario
.run_test(
&policy,
TestExpectations {
file_outside_repo_is_writable: false,
file_in_repo_root_is_writable: false,
file_in_dot_git_dir_is_writable: false,
},
)
.await;
}
/// Verify that user lookups via `pwd.getpwuid(os.getuid())` work under the
/// seatbelt sandbox. Prior to allowing the necessary machlookup for
/// OpenDirectory libinfo, this would fail with `KeyError: getpwuid(): uid not found`.
#[tokio::test]
async fn python_getpwuid_works_under_seatbelt() {
if std::env::var(CODEX_SANDBOX_ENV_VAR) == Ok("seatbelt".to_string()) {
eprintln!("{CODEX_SANDBOX_ENV_VAR} is set to 'seatbelt', skipping test.");
return;
}
// For local dev.
if which::which("python3").is_err() {
eprintln!("python3 not found in PATH, skipping test.");
return;
}
// ReadOnly is sufficient here since we are only exercising user lookup.
let policy = SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly;
let command_cwd = std::env::current_dir().expect("getcwd");
let sandbox_cwd = command_cwd.clone();
let mut child = spawn_command_under_seatbelt(
vec![
"python3".to_string(),
"-c".to_string(),
// Print the passwd struct; success implies lookup worked.
"import pwd, os; print(pwd.getpwuid(os.getuid()))".to_string(),
],
command_cwd,
&policy,
sandbox_cwd.as_path(),
StdioPolicy::RedirectForShellTool,
HashMap::new(),
)
.await
.expect("should be able to spawn python under seatbelt");
let status = child
.wait()
.await
.expect("should be able to wait for child process");
assert!(status.success(), "python exited with {status:?}");
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn java_home_finds_runtime_under_seatbelt() {
if std::env::var(CODEX_SANDBOX_ENV_VAR) == Ok("seatbelt".to_string()) {
eprintln!("{CODEX_SANDBOX_ENV_VAR} is set to 'seatbelt', skipping test.");
return;
}
let java_home_path = Path::new("/usr/libexec/java_home");
if !java_home_path.exists() {
eprintln!("/usr/libexec/java_home is not present, skipping test.");
return;
}
let baseline_output = tokio::process::Command::new(java_home_path)
.env_remove("JAVA_HOME")
.output()
.await
.expect("should be able to invoke java_home outside seatbelt");
if !baseline_output.status.success() {
eprintln!(
"java_home exited with {:?} outside seatbelt, skipping test",
baseline_output.status
);
return;
}
let policy = SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly;
let command_cwd = std::env::current_dir().expect("getcwd");
let sandbox_cwd = command_cwd.clone();
let mut env: HashMap<String, String> = std::env::vars().collect();
env.remove("JAVA_HOME");
env.remove(CODEX_SANDBOX_ENV_VAR);
let child = spawn_command_under_seatbelt(
vec![java_home_path.to_string_lossy().to_string()],
command_cwd,
&policy,
sandbox_cwd.as_path(),
StdioPolicy::RedirectForShellTool,
env,
)
.await
.expect("should be able to spawn java_home under seatbelt");
let output = child
.wait_with_output()
.await
.expect("should be able to wait for java_home child");
assert!(
output.status.success(),
"java_home under seatbelt exited with {:?}, stderr: {}",
output.status,
String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr)
);
let stdout = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout);
assert!(
!stdout.trim().is_empty(),
"java_home stdout unexpectedly empty under seatbelt"
);
}
#[expect(clippy::expect_used)]
fn create_test_scenario(tmp: &TempDir) -> TestScenario {
let repo_parent = tmp.path().to_path_buf();
let repo_root = repo_parent.join("repo");
let dot_git_dir = repo_root.join(".git");
std::fs::create_dir(&repo_root).expect("should be able to create repo root");
std::fs::create_dir(&dot_git_dir).expect("should be able to create .git dir");
TestScenario {
file_outside_repo: repo_parent.join("outside.txt"),
repo_parent,
file_in_repo_root: repo_root.join("repo_file.txt"),
repo_root,
file_in_dot_git_dir: dot_git_dir.join("dot_git_file.txt"),
}
}
#[expect(clippy::expect_used)]
/// Note that `path` must be absolute.
async fn touch(path: &Path, policy: &SandboxPolicy) -> bool {
assert!(path.is_absolute(), "Path must be absolute: {path:?}");
let command_cwd = std::env::current_dir().expect("getcwd");
let sandbox_cwd = command_cwd.clone();
let mut child = spawn_command_under_seatbelt(
vec![
"/usr/bin/touch".to_string(),
path.to_string_lossy().to_string(),
],
command_cwd,
policy,
sandbox_cwd.as_path(),
StdioPolicy::RedirectForShellTool,
HashMap::new(),
)
.await
.expect("should be able to spawn command under seatbelt");
child
.wait()
.await
.expect("should be able to wait for child process")
.success()
}