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llmx/codex-cli/scripts/run_in_container.sh

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#!/bin/bash
set -e
# Usage:
# ./run_in_container.sh [--work_dir directory] "COMMAND"
#
# Examples:
# ./run_in_container.sh --work_dir project/code "ls -la"
# ./run_in_container.sh "echo Hello, world!"
# Default the work directory to WORKSPACE_ROOT_DIR if not provided.
WORK_DIR="${WORKSPACE_ROOT_DIR:-$(pwd)}"
# Parse optional flag.
if [ "$1" = "--work_dir" ]; then
if [ -z "$2" ]; then
echo "Error: --work_dir flag provided but no directory specified."
exit 1
fi
WORK_DIR="$2"
shift 2
fi
WORK_DIR=$(realpath "$WORK_DIR")
# Generate a unique container name based on the normalized work directory
CONTAINER_NAME="codex_$(echo "$WORK_DIR" | sed 's/\//_/g' | sed 's/[^a-zA-Z0-9_-]//g')"
# Define cleanup to remove the container on script exit, ensuring no leftover containers
cleanup() {
docker rm -f "$CONTAINER_NAME" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
}
# Trap EXIT to invoke cleanup regardless of how the script terminates
trap cleanup EXIT
# Ensure a command is provided.
if [ "$#" -eq 0 ]; then
echo "Usage: $0 [--work_dir directory] \"COMMAND\""
exit 1
fi
# Check if WORK_DIR is set.
if [ -z "$WORK_DIR" ]; then
echo "Error: No work directory provided and WORKSPACE_ROOT_DIR is not set."
exit 1
fi
# Kill any existing container for the working directory using cleanup(), centralizing removal logic.
cleanup
# Run the container with the specified directory mounted at the same path inside the container.
docker run --name "$CONTAINER_NAME" -d \
-e OPENAI_API_KEY \
--cap-add=NET_ADMIN \
--cap-add=NET_RAW \
-v "$WORK_DIR:/app$WORK_DIR" \
codex \
sleep infinity
fix: do not grant "node" user sudo access when using run_in_container.sh (#627) This exploration came out of my review of https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/414. `run_in_container.sh` runs Codex in a Docker container like so: https://github.com/openai/codex/blob/bd1c3deed9f4f103e755baa3f3a45e7a1c1a134b/codex-cli/scripts/run_in_container.sh#L51-L58 But then runs `init_firewall.sh` to set up the firewall to restrict network access. Previously, we did this by adding `/usr/local/bin/init_firewall.sh` to the container and adding a special rule in `/etc/sudoers.d` so the unprivileged user (`node`) could run the privileged `init_firewall.sh` script to open up the firewall for `api.openai.com`: https://github.com/openai/codex/blob/31d0d7a305305ad557035a2edcab60b6be5018d8/codex-cli/Dockerfile#L51-L56 Though I believe this is unnecessary, as we can use `docker exec --user root` from _outside_ the container to run `/usr/local/bin/init_firewall.sh` as `root` without adding a special case in `/etc/sudoers.d`. This appears to work as expected, as I tested it by doing the following: ``` ./codex-cli/scripts/build_container.sh ./codex-cli/scripts/run_in_container.sh 'what is the output of `curl https://www.openai.com`' ``` This was a bit funny because in some of my runs, Codex wasn't convinced it had network access, so I had to convince it to try the `curl` request: ![image](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/80bd487c-74e2-4cd3-aa0f-26a6edd8d3f7) As you can see, when it ran `curl -s https\://www.openai.com`, it a connection failure, so the network policy appears to be working as intended. Note this PR also removes `sudo` from the `apt-get install` list in the `Dockerfile`.
2025-04-24 14:25:02 -07:00
# Initialize the firewall inside the container with root privileges.
docker exec --user root "$CONTAINER_NAME" /usr/local/bin/init_firewall.sh
# Execute the provided command in the container, ensuring it runs in the work directory.
# We use a parameterized bash command to safely handle the command and directory.
quoted_args=""
for arg in "$@"; do
quoted_args+=" $(printf '%q' "$arg")"
done
docker exec -it "$CONTAINER_NAME" bash -c "cd \"/app$WORK_DIR\" && codex --full-auto ${quoted_args}"