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llmx/codex-rs/core/src/protocol.rs

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//! Defines the protocol for a Codex session between a client and an agent.
//!
//! Uses a SQ (Submission Queue) / EQ (Event Queue) pattern to asynchronously communicate
//! between user and agent.
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::path::PathBuf;
use serde::Deserialize;
use serde::Serialize;
/// Submission Queue Entry - requests from user
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize, Serialize)]
pub struct Submission {
/// Unique id for this Submission to correlate with Events
pub id: String,
/// Payload
pub op: Op,
}
/// Submission operation
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize, Serialize)]
#[serde(tag = "type", rename_all = "snake_case")]
#[non_exhaustive]
pub enum Op {
/// Configure the model session.
ConfigureSession {
/// If not specified, server will use its default model.
model: String,
/// Model instructions
instructions: Option<String>,
/// When to escalate for approval for execution
approval_policy: AskForApproval,
/// How to sandbox commands executed in the system
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy,
/// Disable server-side response storage (send full context each request)
#[serde(default)]
disable_response_storage: bool,
},
/// Abort current task.
/// This server sends no corresponding Event
Interrupt,
/// Input from the user
UserInput {
/// User input items, see `InputItem`
items: Vec<InputItem>,
},
/// Approve a command execution
ExecApproval {
/// The id of the submission we are approving
id: String,
/// The user's decision in response to the request.
decision: ReviewDecision,
},
/// Approve a code patch
PatchApproval {
/// The id of the submission we are approving
id: String,
/// The user's decision in response to the request.
decision: ReviewDecision,
},
}
/// Determines how liberally commands are autoapproved by the system.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, Default, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "kebab-case")]
pub enum AskForApproval {
/// Under this policy, only “known safe” commands—as determined by
/// `is_safe_command()`—that **only read files** are autoapproved.
/// Everything else will ask the user to approve.
#[default]
UnlessAllowListed,
/// In addition to everything allowed by **`Suggest`**, commands that
/// *write* to files **within the users approved list of writable paths**
/// are also autoapproved.
/// TODO(ragona): fix
AutoEdit,
/// *All* commands are autoapproved, but they are expected to run inside a
/// sandbox where network access is disabled and writes are confined to a
/// specific set of paths. If the command fails, it will be escalated to
/// the user to approve execution without a sandbox.
OnFailure,
/// Never ask the user to approve commands. Failures are immediately returned
/// to the model, and never escalated to the user for approval.
Never,
}
/// Determines execution restrictions for model shell commands
fix: overhaul SandboxPolicy and config loading in Rust (#732) Previous to this PR, `SandboxPolicy` was a bit difficult to work with: https://github.com/openai/codex/blob/237f8a11e11fdcc793a09e787e48215676d9b95b/codex-rs/core/src/protocol.rs#L98-L108 Specifically: * It was an `enum` and therefore options were mutually exclusive as opposed to additive. * It defined things in terms of what the agent _could not_ do as opposed to what they _could_ do. This made things hard to support because we would prefer to build up a sandbox config by starting with something extremely restrictive and only granting permissions for things the user as explicitly allowed. This PR changes things substantially by redefining the policy in terms of two concepts: * A `SandboxPermission` enum that defines permissions that can be granted to the agent/sandbox. * A `SandboxPolicy` that internally stores a `Vec<SandboxPermission>`, but externally exposes a simpler API that can be used to configure Seatbelt/Landlock. Previous to this PR, we supported a `--sandbox` flag that effectively mapped to an enum value in `SandboxPolicy`. Though now that `SandboxPolicy` is a wrapper around `Vec<SandboxPermission>`, the single `--sandbox` flag no longer makes sense. While I could have turned it into a flag that the user can specify multiple times, I think the current values to use with such a flag are long and potentially messy, so for the moment, I have dropped support for `--sandbox` altogether and we can bring it back once we have figured out the naming thing. Since `--sandbox` is gone, users now have to specify `--full-auto` to get a sandbox that allows writes in `cwd`. Admittedly, there is no clean way to specify the equivalent of `--full-auto` in your `config.toml` right now, so we will have to revisit that, as well. Because `Config` presents a `SandboxPolicy` field and `SandboxPolicy` changed considerably, I had to overhaul how config loading works, as well. There are now two distinct concepts, `ConfigToml` and `Config`: * `ConfigToml` is the deserialization of `~/.codex/config.toml`. As one might expect, every field is `Optional` and it is `#[derive(Deserialize, Default)]`. Consistent use of `Optional` makes it clear what the user has specified explicitly. * `Config` is the "normalized config" and is produced by merging `ConfigToml` with `ConfigOverrides`. Where `ConfigToml` contains a raw `Option<Vec<SandboxPermission>>`, `Config` presents only the final `SandboxPolicy`. The changes to `core/src/exec.rs` and `core/src/linux.rs` merit extra special attention to ensure we are faithfully mapping the `SandboxPolicy` to the Seatbelt and Landlock configs, respectively. Also, take note that `core/src/seatbelt_readonly_policy.sbpl` has been renamed to `codex-rs/core/src/seatbelt_base_policy.sbpl` and that `(allow file-read*)` has been removed from the `.sbpl` file as now this is added to the policy in `core/src/exec.rs` when `sandbox_policy.has_full_disk_read_access()` is `true`.
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Deserialize, Serialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "kebab-case")]
fix: overhaul SandboxPolicy and config loading in Rust (#732) Previous to this PR, `SandboxPolicy` was a bit difficult to work with: https://github.com/openai/codex/blob/237f8a11e11fdcc793a09e787e48215676d9b95b/codex-rs/core/src/protocol.rs#L98-L108 Specifically: * It was an `enum` and therefore options were mutually exclusive as opposed to additive. * It defined things in terms of what the agent _could not_ do as opposed to what they _could_ do. This made things hard to support because we would prefer to build up a sandbox config by starting with something extremely restrictive and only granting permissions for things the user as explicitly allowed. This PR changes things substantially by redefining the policy in terms of two concepts: * A `SandboxPermission` enum that defines permissions that can be granted to the agent/sandbox. * A `SandboxPolicy` that internally stores a `Vec<SandboxPermission>`, but externally exposes a simpler API that can be used to configure Seatbelt/Landlock. Previous to this PR, we supported a `--sandbox` flag that effectively mapped to an enum value in `SandboxPolicy`. Though now that `SandboxPolicy` is a wrapper around `Vec<SandboxPermission>`, the single `--sandbox` flag no longer makes sense. While I could have turned it into a flag that the user can specify multiple times, I think the current values to use with such a flag are long and potentially messy, so for the moment, I have dropped support for `--sandbox` altogether and we can bring it back once we have figured out the naming thing. Since `--sandbox` is gone, users now have to specify `--full-auto` to get a sandbox that allows writes in `cwd`. Admittedly, there is no clean way to specify the equivalent of `--full-auto` in your `config.toml` right now, so we will have to revisit that, as well. Because `Config` presents a `SandboxPolicy` field and `SandboxPolicy` changed considerably, I had to overhaul how config loading works, as well. There are now two distinct concepts, `ConfigToml` and `Config`: * `ConfigToml` is the deserialization of `~/.codex/config.toml`. As one might expect, every field is `Optional` and it is `#[derive(Deserialize, Default)]`. Consistent use of `Optional` makes it clear what the user has specified explicitly. * `Config` is the "normalized config" and is produced by merging `ConfigToml` with `ConfigOverrides`. Where `ConfigToml` contains a raw `Option<Vec<SandboxPermission>>`, `Config` presents only the final `SandboxPolicy`. The changes to `core/src/exec.rs` and `core/src/linux.rs` merit extra special attention to ensure we are faithfully mapping the `SandboxPolicy` to the Seatbelt and Landlock configs, respectively. Also, take note that `core/src/seatbelt_readonly_policy.sbpl` has been renamed to `codex-rs/core/src/seatbelt_base_policy.sbpl` and that `(allow file-read*)` has been removed from the `.sbpl` file as now this is added to the policy in `core/src/exec.rs` when `sandbox_policy.has_full_disk_read_access()` is `true`.
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pub struct SandboxPolicy {
permissions: Vec<SandboxPermission>,
}
impl From<Vec<SandboxPermission>> for SandboxPolicy {
fn from(permissions: Vec<SandboxPermission>) -> Self {
Self { permissions }
}
}
impl SandboxPolicy {
fix: overhaul SandboxPolicy and config loading in Rust (#732) Previous to this PR, `SandboxPolicy` was a bit difficult to work with: https://github.com/openai/codex/blob/237f8a11e11fdcc793a09e787e48215676d9b95b/codex-rs/core/src/protocol.rs#L98-L108 Specifically: * It was an `enum` and therefore options were mutually exclusive as opposed to additive. * It defined things in terms of what the agent _could not_ do as opposed to what they _could_ do. This made things hard to support because we would prefer to build up a sandbox config by starting with something extremely restrictive and only granting permissions for things the user as explicitly allowed. This PR changes things substantially by redefining the policy in terms of two concepts: * A `SandboxPermission` enum that defines permissions that can be granted to the agent/sandbox. * A `SandboxPolicy` that internally stores a `Vec<SandboxPermission>`, but externally exposes a simpler API that can be used to configure Seatbelt/Landlock. Previous to this PR, we supported a `--sandbox` flag that effectively mapped to an enum value in `SandboxPolicy`. Though now that `SandboxPolicy` is a wrapper around `Vec<SandboxPermission>`, the single `--sandbox` flag no longer makes sense. While I could have turned it into a flag that the user can specify multiple times, I think the current values to use with such a flag are long and potentially messy, so for the moment, I have dropped support for `--sandbox` altogether and we can bring it back once we have figured out the naming thing. Since `--sandbox` is gone, users now have to specify `--full-auto` to get a sandbox that allows writes in `cwd`. Admittedly, there is no clean way to specify the equivalent of `--full-auto` in your `config.toml` right now, so we will have to revisit that, as well. Because `Config` presents a `SandboxPolicy` field and `SandboxPolicy` changed considerably, I had to overhaul how config loading works, as well. There are now two distinct concepts, `ConfigToml` and `Config`: * `ConfigToml` is the deserialization of `~/.codex/config.toml`. As one might expect, every field is `Optional` and it is `#[derive(Deserialize, Default)]`. Consistent use of `Optional` makes it clear what the user has specified explicitly. * `Config` is the "normalized config" and is produced by merging `ConfigToml` with `ConfigOverrides`. Where `ConfigToml` contains a raw `Option<Vec<SandboxPermission>>`, `Config` presents only the final `SandboxPolicy`. The changes to `core/src/exec.rs` and `core/src/linux.rs` merit extra special attention to ensure we are faithfully mapping the `SandboxPolicy` to the Seatbelt and Landlock configs, respectively. Also, take note that `core/src/seatbelt_readonly_policy.sbpl` has been renamed to `codex-rs/core/src/seatbelt_base_policy.sbpl` and that `(allow file-read*)` has been removed from the `.sbpl` file as now this is added to the policy in `core/src/exec.rs` when `sandbox_policy.has_full_disk_read_access()` is `true`.
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pub fn new_read_only_policy() -> Self {
Self {
permissions: vec![SandboxPermission::DiskFullReadAccess],
}
}
fix: overhaul SandboxPolicy and config loading in Rust (#732) Previous to this PR, `SandboxPolicy` was a bit difficult to work with: https://github.com/openai/codex/blob/237f8a11e11fdcc793a09e787e48215676d9b95b/codex-rs/core/src/protocol.rs#L98-L108 Specifically: * It was an `enum` and therefore options were mutually exclusive as opposed to additive. * It defined things in terms of what the agent _could not_ do as opposed to what they _could_ do. This made things hard to support because we would prefer to build up a sandbox config by starting with something extremely restrictive and only granting permissions for things the user as explicitly allowed. This PR changes things substantially by redefining the policy in terms of two concepts: * A `SandboxPermission` enum that defines permissions that can be granted to the agent/sandbox. * A `SandboxPolicy` that internally stores a `Vec<SandboxPermission>`, but externally exposes a simpler API that can be used to configure Seatbelt/Landlock. Previous to this PR, we supported a `--sandbox` flag that effectively mapped to an enum value in `SandboxPolicy`. Though now that `SandboxPolicy` is a wrapper around `Vec<SandboxPermission>`, the single `--sandbox` flag no longer makes sense. While I could have turned it into a flag that the user can specify multiple times, I think the current values to use with such a flag are long and potentially messy, so for the moment, I have dropped support for `--sandbox` altogether and we can bring it back once we have figured out the naming thing. Since `--sandbox` is gone, users now have to specify `--full-auto` to get a sandbox that allows writes in `cwd`. Admittedly, there is no clean way to specify the equivalent of `--full-auto` in your `config.toml` right now, so we will have to revisit that, as well. Because `Config` presents a `SandboxPolicy` field and `SandboxPolicy` changed considerably, I had to overhaul how config loading works, as well. There are now two distinct concepts, `ConfigToml` and `Config`: * `ConfigToml` is the deserialization of `~/.codex/config.toml`. As one might expect, every field is `Optional` and it is `#[derive(Deserialize, Default)]`. Consistent use of `Optional` makes it clear what the user has specified explicitly. * `Config` is the "normalized config" and is produced by merging `ConfigToml` with `ConfigOverrides`. Where `ConfigToml` contains a raw `Option<Vec<SandboxPermission>>`, `Config` presents only the final `SandboxPolicy`. The changes to `core/src/exec.rs` and `core/src/linux.rs` merit extra special attention to ensure we are faithfully mapping the `SandboxPolicy` to the Seatbelt and Landlock configs, respectively. Also, take note that `core/src/seatbelt_readonly_policy.sbpl` has been renamed to `codex-rs/core/src/seatbelt_base_policy.sbpl` and that `(allow file-read*)` has been removed from the `.sbpl` file as now this is added to the policy in `core/src/exec.rs` when `sandbox_policy.has_full_disk_read_access()` is `true`.
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pub fn new_read_only_policy_with_writable_roots(writable_roots: &[PathBuf]) -> Self {
let mut permissions = Self::new_read_only_policy().permissions;
permissions.extend(writable_roots.iter().map(|folder| {
SandboxPermission::DiskWriteFolder {
folder: folder.clone(),
}
}));
Self { permissions }
}
pub fn new_full_auto_policy() -> Self {
Self {
permissions: vec![
SandboxPermission::DiskFullReadAccess,
SandboxPermission::DiskWritePlatformUserTempFolder,
SandboxPermission::DiskWriteCwd,
],
}
}
pub fn has_full_disk_read_access(&self) -> bool {
self.permissions
.iter()
.any(|perm| matches!(perm, SandboxPermission::DiskFullReadAccess))
}
pub fn has_full_disk_write_access(&self) -> bool {
self.permissions
.iter()
.any(|perm| matches!(perm, SandboxPermission::DiskFullWriteAccess))
}
pub fn has_full_network_access(&self) -> bool {
self.permissions
.iter()
.any(|perm| matches!(perm, SandboxPermission::NetworkFullAccess))
}
pub fn get_writable_roots(&self) -> Vec<PathBuf> {
let mut writable_roots = Vec::<PathBuf>::new();
for perm in &self.permissions {
use SandboxPermission::*;
match perm {
DiskWritePlatformUserTempFolder => {
if cfg!(target_os = "macos") {
if let Some(tempdir) = std::env::var_os("TMPDIR") {
// Likely something that starts with /var/folders/...
let tmpdir_path = PathBuf::from(&tempdir);
if tmpdir_path.is_absolute() {
writable_roots.push(tmpdir_path.clone());
match tmpdir_path.canonicalize() {
Ok(canonicalized) => {
// Likely something that starts with /private/var/folders/...
if canonicalized != tmpdir_path {
writable_roots.push(canonicalized);
}
}
Err(e) => {
tracing::error!("Failed to canonicalize TMPDIR: {e}");
}
}
} else {
tracing::error!("TMPDIR is not an absolute path: {tempdir:?}");
}
}
}
// For Linux, should this be XDG_RUNTIME_DIR, /run/user/<uid>, or something else?
}
DiskWritePlatformGlobalTempFolder => {
if cfg!(unix) {
writable_roots.push(PathBuf::from("/tmp"));
}
}
DiskWriteCwd => match std::env::current_dir() {
Ok(cwd) => writable_roots.push(cwd),
Err(err) => {
tracing::error!("Failed to get current working directory: {err}");
}
},
DiskWriteFolder { folder } => {
writable_roots.push(folder.clone());
}
DiskFullReadAccess | NetworkFullAccess => {}
DiskFullWriteAccess => {
// Currently, we expect callers to only invoke this method
// after verifying has_full_disk_write_access() is false.
}
}
}
writable_roots
}
fix: overhaul SandboxPolicy and config loading in Rust (#732) Previous to this PR, `SandboxPolicy` was a bit difficult to work with: https://github.com/openai/codex/blob/237f8a11e11fdcc793a09e787e48215676d9b95b/codex-rs/core/src/protocol.rs#L98-L108 Specifically: * It was an `enum` and therefore options were mutually exclusive as opposed to additive. * It defined things in terms of what the agent _could not_ do as opposed to what they _could_ do. This made things hard to support because we would prefer to build up a sandbox config by starting with something extremely restrictive and only granting permissions for things the user as explicitly allowed. This PR changes things substantially by redefining the policy in terms of two concepts: * A `SandboxPermission` enum that defines permissions that can be granted to the agent/sandbox. * A `SandboxPolicy` that internally stores a `Vec<SandboxPermission>`, but externally exposes a simpler API that can be used to configure Seatbelt/Landlock. Previous to this PR, we supported a `--sandbox` flag that effectively mapped to an enum value in `SandboxPolicy`. Though now that `SandboxPolicy` is a wrapper around `Vec<SandboxPermission>`, the single `--sandbox` flag no longer makes sense. While I could have turned it into a flag that the user can specify multiple times, I think the current values to use with such a flag are long and potentially messy, so for the moment, I have dropped support for `--sandbox` altogether and we can bring it back once we have figured out the naming thing. Since `--sandbox` is gone, users now have to specify `--full-auto` to get a sandbox that allows writes in `cwd`. Admittedly, there is no clean way to specify the equivalent of `--full-auto` in your `config.toml` right now, so we will have to revisit that, as well. Because `Config` presents a `SandboxPolicy` field and `SandboxPolicy` changed considerably, I had to overhaul how config loading works, as well. There are now two distinct concepts, `ConfigToml` and `Config`: * `ConfigToml` is the deserialization of `~/.codex/config.toml`. As one might expect, every field is `Optional` and it is `#[derive(Deserialize, Default)]`. Consistent use of `Optional` makes it clear what the user has specified explicitly. * `Config` is the "normalized config" and is produced by merging `ConfigToml` with `ConfigOverrides`. Where `ConfigToml` contains a raw `Option<Vec<SandboxPermission>>`, `Config` presents only the final `SandboxPolicy`. The changes to `core/src/exec.rs` and `core/src/linux.rs` merit extra special attention to ensure we are faithfully mapping the `SandboxPolicy` to the Seatbelt and Landlock configs, respectively. Also, take note that `core/src/seatbelt_readonly_policy.sbpl` has been renamed to `codex-rs/core/src/seatbelt_base_policy.sbpl` and that `(allow file-read*)` has been removed from the `.sbpl` file as now this is added to the policy in `core/src/exec.rs` when `sandbox_policy.has_full_disk_read_access()` is `true`.
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pub fn is_unrestricted(&self) -> bool {
self.has_full_disk_read_access()
&& self.has_full_disk_write_access()
&& self.has_full_network_access()
}
}
fix: overhaul SandboxPolicy and config loading in Rust (#732) Previous to this PR, `SandboxPolicy` was a bit difficult to work with: https://github.com/openai/codex/blob/237f8a11e11fdcc793a09e787e48215676d9b95b/codex-rs/core/src/protocol.rs#L98-L108 Specifically: * It was an `enum` and therefore options were mutually exclusive as opposed to additive. * It defined things in terms of what the agent _could not_ do as opposed to what they _could_ do. This made things hard to support because we would prefer to build up a sandbox config by starting with something extremely restrictive and only granting permissions for things the user as explicitly allowed. This PR changes things substantially by redefining the policy in terms of two concepts: * A `SandboxPermission` enum that defines permissions that can be granted to the agent/sandbox. * A `SandboxPolicy` that internally stores a `Vec<SandboxPermission>`, but externally exposes a simpler API that can be used to configure Seatbelt/Landlock. Previous to this PR, we supported a `--sandbox` flag that effectively mapped to an enum value in `SandboxPolicy`. Though now that `SandboxPolicy` is a wrapper around `Vec<SandboxPermission>`, the single `--sandbox` flag no longer makes sense. While I could have turned it into a flag that the user can specify multiple times, I think the current values to use with such a flag are long and potentially messy, so for the moment, I have dropped support for `--sandbox` altogether and we can bring it back once we have figured out the naming thing. Since `--sandbox` is gone, users now have to specify `--full-auto` to get a sandbox that allows writes in `cwd`. Admittedly, there is no clean way to specify the equivalent of `--full-auto` in your `config.toml` right now, so we will have to revisit that, as well. Because `Config` presents a `SandboxPolicy` field and `SandboxPolicy` changed considerably, I had to overhaul how config loading works, as well. There are now two distinct concepts, `ConfigToml` and `Config`: * `ConfigToml` is the deserialization of `~/.codex/config.toml`. As one might expect, every field is `Optional` and it is `#[derive(Deserialize, Default)]`. Consistent use of `Optional` makes it clear what the user has specified explicitly. * `Config` is the "normalized config" and is produced by merging `ConfigToml` with `ConfigOverrides`. Where `ConfigToml` contains a raw `Option<Vec<SandboxPermission>>`, `Config` presents only the final `SandboxPolicy`. The changes to `core/src/exec.rs` and `core/src/linux.rs` merit extra special attention to ensure we are faithfully mapping the `SandboxPolicy` to the Seatbelt and Landlock configs, respectively. Also, take note that `core/src/seatbelt_readonly_policy.sbpl` has been renamed to `codex-rs/core/src/seatbelt_base_policy.sbpl` and that `(allow file-read*)` has been removed from the `.sbpl` file as now this is added to the policy in `core/src/exec.rs` when `sandbox_policy.has_full_disk_read_access()` is `true`.
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/// Permissions that should be granted to the sandbox in which the agent
/// operates.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "kebab-case")]
pub enum SandboxPermission {
/// Is allowed to read all files on disk.
DiskFullReadAccess,
/// Is allowed to write to the operating system's temp dir that
/// is restricted to the user the agent is running as. For
/// example, on macOS, this is generally something under
/// `/var/folders` as opposed to `/tmp`.
DiskWritePlatformUserTempFolder,
/// Is allowed to write to the operating system's shared temp
/// dir. On UNIX, this is generally `/tmp`.
DiskWritePlatformGlobalTempFolder,
/// Is allowed to write to the current working directory (in practice, this
/// is the `cwd` where `codex` was spawned).
DiskWriteCwd,
/// Is allowed to the specified folder. `PathBuf` must be an
/// absolute path, though it is up to the caller to canonicalize
/// it if the path contains symlinks.
DiskWriteFolder { folder: PathBuf },
/// Is allowed to write to any file on disk.
DiskFullWriteAccess,
/// Can make arbitrary network requests.
NetworkFullAccess,
}
/// User input
#[non_exhaustive]
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize, Serialize)]
#[serde(tag = "type", rename_all = "snake_case")]
pub enum InputItem {
Text {
text: String,
},
/// Preencoded data: URI image.
Image {
image_url: String,
},
/// Local image path provided by the user. This will be converted to an
/// `Image` variant (base64 data URL) during request serialization.
LocalImage {
path: std::path::PathBuf,
},
}
/// Event Queue Entry - events from agent
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize, Serialize)]
pub struct Event {
/// Submission `id` that this event is correlated with.
pub id: String,
/// Payload
pub msg: EventMsg,
}
/// Response event from the agent
#[non_exhaustive]
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize, Serialize)]
#[serde(tag = "type", rename_all = "snake_case")]
pub enum EventMsg {
/// Error while executing a submission
Error {
message: String,
},
/// Agent has started a task
TaskStarted,
/// Agent has completed all actions
TaskComplete,
/// Agent text output message
AgentMessage {
message: String,
},
/// Ack the client's configure message.
SessionConfigured {
/// Tell the client what model is being queried.
model: String,
},
/// Notification that the server is about to execute a command.
ExecCommandBegin {
/// Identifier so this can be paired with the ExecCommandEnd event.
call_id: String,
/// The command to be executed.
command: Vec<String>,
/// The command's working directory if not the default cwd for the
/// agent.
cwd: String,
},
ExecCommandEnd {
/// Identifier for the ExecCommandBegin that finished.
call_id: String,
/// Captured stdout
stdout: String,
/// Captured stderr
stderr: String,
/// The command's exit code.
exit_code: i32,
},
ExecApprovalRequest {
/// The command to be executed.
command: Vec<String>,
/// The command's working directory.
cwd: PathBuf,
/// Optional humanreadable reason for the approval (e.g. retry without
/// sandbox).
#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
reason: Option<String>,
},
ApplyPatchApprovalRequest {
changes: HashMap<PathBuf, FileChange>,
/// Optional explanatory reason (e.g. request for extra write access).
#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
reason: Option<String>,
/// When set, the agent is asking the user to allow writes under this
/// root for the remainder of the session.
#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
grant_root: Option<PathBuf>,
},
BackgroundEvent {
message: String,
},
/// Notification that the agent is about to apply a code patch. Mirrors
/// `ExecCommandBegin` so frontends can show progress indicators.
PatchApplyBegin {
/// Identifier so this can be paired with the PatchApplyEnd event.
call_id: String,
/// If true, there was no ApplyPatchApprovalRequest for this patch.
auto_approved: bool,
/// The changes to be applied.
changes: HashMap<PathBuf, FileChange>,
},
/// Notification that a patch application has finished.
PatchApplyEnd {
/// Identifier for the PatchApplyBegin that finished.
call_id: String,
/// Captured stdout (summary printed by apply_patch).
stdout: String,
/// Captured stderr (parser errors, IO failures, etc.).
stderr: String,
/// Whether the patch was applied successfully.
success: bool,
},
}
/// User's decision in response to an ExecApprovalRequest.
#[derive(Debug, Default, Clone, Copy, Deserialize, Serialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
pub enum ReviewDecision {
/// User has approved this command and the agent should execute it.
Approved,
/// User has approved this command and wants to automatically approve any
/// future identical instances (`command` and `cwd` match exactly) for the
/// remainder of the session.
ApprovedForSession,
/// User has denied this command and the agent should not execute it, but
/// it should continue the session and try something else.
#[default]
Denied,
/// User has denied this command and the agent should not do anything until
/// the user's next command.
Abort,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize, Serialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
pub enum FileChange {
Add {
content: String,
},
Delete,
Update {
unified_diff: String,
move_path: Option<PathBuf>,
},
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize, Serialize)]
pub struct Chunk {
/// 1-based line index of the first line in the original file
pub orig_index: u32,
pub deleted_lines: Vec<String>,
pub inserted_lines: Vec<String>,
}